301 A.3d 633
D.C.2023Background:
- In 2019 Regnery/Salem published Luke Rosiak’s book Obstruction of Justice alleging serious misconduct by five former House IT employees (the Awans) who had been investigated by House OIG, Capitol Police, and FBI.
- The Awans sued Salem (and others) in D.C. Superior Court for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and unjust enrichment arising from statements in the book and related publicity.
- Salem filed a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti‑SLAPP Act; the trial court found Salem’s publication was protected public‑interest advocacy but denied the motion, concluding the Awans were private figures and were likely to succeed on defamation, IIED, and unjust enrichment claims.
- Salem appealed the denial; the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether a jury properly instructed could reasonably find the claims supported by the evidence proffered.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed denial as to the defamation claim (holding the Awans are not limited‑purpose or involuntary public figures) but reversed as to IIED (publication not "extreme and outrageous") and unjust enrichment (disgorgement not available for alleged defamation).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Awans are public figures (triggering actual‑malice standard) | Awans are private individuals involuntarily drawn into scrutiny; negligence fault standard applies | Awans are limited‑purpose or involuntary public figures; actual malice required | Affirmed: Awans are not limited‑purpose or involuntary public figures; negligence standard applies; denial of Anti‑SLAPP re defamation stands |
| Whether Salem’s publication supports IIED (extreme & outrageous conduct causing severe distress) | Multi‑year campaign of false, xenophobic conspiracies caused severe emotional distress | Publishing a book on a matter of public interest is protected speech and not atrocious enough for IIED | Reversed: Publication of the book is not extreme and outrageous; IIED claim dismissed |
| Whether unjust enrichment/disgorgement of book profits is available for defamatory publication | Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of profits earned from using their names and reputations | Unjust enrichment requires a conferral of benefit; plaintiffs did not confer such a benefit; disgorgement is improper for defamation | Reversed: Unjust enrichment remedy is unavailable here; disgorgement denied |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (First Amendment requires actual malice standard for defamation by public officials)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (private individuals are not subject to actual malice standard; states may set liability for private‑figure defamation)
- Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2016) (describing Anti‑SLAPP special‑motion procedure and plaintiff’s burden to show likelihood of success)
- Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (framework for determining public‑figure status in limited‑purpose controversy)
- Fridman v. Orbis Bus. Intel. Ltd., 229 A.3d 494 (D.C. 2020) (example of finding limited‑purpose public figures based on extensive media prominence)
- Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (rejecting automatic public‑figure status for subjects involuntarily involved in investigations)
- Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (recognizing narrow circumstances where an individual may be an involuntary public figure)