268 So. 3d 430
La. Ct. App.2019Background
- On Aug. 22, 2015 a three-vehicle crash on Highway 65: Saldana (driver of a Honda) collided first with an empty Peterbilt log truck driven by Glover (employed by LaRue Trucking), then struck a parked Mack log truck owned by Rowland Timber and driven by Sanders (who was outside the truck at the time).
- Rowland Timber had contracted with Armstrong to harvest/haul timber and had an oral agreement with LaRue to haul additional logs; both Rowland and LaRue were registered motor carriers with separate USDOT numbers.
- Plaintiff sued drivers, owners, employers, and insurers; multiple summary judgments were granted below, leaving only LaRue, Noland, and Glover (uninsured) as defendants in the trial court.
- Relevant defenses by Rowland Timber/National Fire included: (1) Sanders was lawfully parked and not a cause; (2) Rowland was not vicariously liable for LaRue/Glover under state law or FMCSR; and (3) Rowland had no duty to post warning signs for logging truck ingress/egress.
- Rowland initially asserted (in an answer) that orange “Log Trucks Entering Highway” signs had been posted, but later argued it owed no duty to post signs; testimony conflicted as to whether signs were actually present.
- On appeal Saldana abandoned several challenges and only contested (1) whether Rowland voluntarily assumed a duty to warn by posting signs, and (2) whether Rowland could be vicariously liable under the FMCSR as a statutory employer of Glover.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to warn / signage (voluntary assumption) | Rowland customarily posted orange warning signs and thus voluntarily assumed a duty to warn motorists; failure to post (or maintain) signs breached that duty. | No legal duty to post signs; Rowland disavowed any assumed duty in its motion and argued no statutory obligation existed. | Reversed summary judgment. Genuine factual disputes exist about whether Rowland voluntarily assumed a duty and breached it; issue must go to jury. |
| Vicarious liability under FMCSR (statutory employee) | FMCSR definitions and agency guidance render drivers "employees" (including independent contractors) for FMCSR purposes; Rowland "assigned" this load so may be statutorily liable. | No lease existed; both companies had separate USDOT numbers; FMCSR statutory-employee rules apply to lease/lease-like arrangements and owner-operators, not this oral hauling arrangement. | Affirmed summary judgment. FMCSR does not impose vicarious tort liability here; no lease/owner-operator relationship to trigger statutory employer status. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schultz v. Guoth, 57 So.3d 1002 (La. 2011) (summary-judgment standard)
- Maggio v. Parker, 250 So.3d 874 (La. 2018) (summary-judgment standard; resolve doubts for nonmovant)
- Harris v. Pizza Hut of La., Inc., 455 So.2d 1364 (La. 1984) (voluntarily assumed duty must be performed with due care)
- Bijeaux v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 702 So.2d 1088 (La. App. 3 Cir.) (no mandatory duty to post warning signs for agricultural ingress/egress)
- Racca v. St. Mary Sugar Coop., Inc., 872 So.2d 1117 (La. App. 1 Cir.) (upholding summary judgment where no duty to post harvest-season warning signs existed)
- Jackson v. Wise, 249 So.3d 845 (La. App. 1 Cir.) (FMCSR does not itself create a state-law vicarious-liability scheme)
- Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 914 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 2019) (regulations focus on leased equipment; "arrangement" construed as lease-like for applicability)
- Beavers v. Victorian, 38 F.Supp.3d 1260 (W.D. Okla.) (FMCSA guidance about employee status pertains to regulatory compliance, limited persuasive value on common-law tort vicarious liability)