Salazar v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
518 S.W.3d 713
Ark. Ct. App.2017Background
- Appellant (mother) and her fiancé Jeffrey McCollum were arrested in Arkansas in Nov. 2014 after synthetic marijuana and infant A.M. were found in their car; DHS removed A.M. and filed dependency-neglect and emergency-custody petitions.
- Appellant lived in Texas; Arkansas court pursued placement via the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC); Texas denied the ICPC home study for appellant’s home citing safety/well-being concerns (notably McCollum’s untreated schizophrenia and background issues).
- Appellant and McCollum completed many case-plan services (counseling, drug treatment, parenting classes); Texas nonetheless denied final home approval, and DHS submitted addenda that Texas concluded did not resolve original concerns.
- DHS changed the permanency goal to termination and adoption after the ICPC denial and subsequent review orders; DHS filed to terminate parental rights alleging multiple statutory grounds including post-petition ‘‘other factors’’ (failure to remedy subsequent issues).
- At the TPR hearing, DHS emphasized McCollum’s late engagement in psychiatric care, appellant’s financial instability and reliance on family (including her father, a registered sex offender), and that A.M. was adoptable; the trial court found statutory grounds and that termination was in A.M.’s best interest.
- On appeal, appellant argued the trial court improperly deferred to the Texas ICPC decision and that evidence was insufficient to support termination or best-interest findings; the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether circuit court erred by relying on Texas ICPC home-study denial instead of making independent findings on interstate placement | Salazar argued Arkansas law permits parental placement across state lines without ICPC study and trial court abdicated its duty to evaluate evidence | DHS and court relied on ICPC process and multiple court orders stating placement required an approved Texas ICPC home study; appellant failed to raise this issue below | Not reviewed on appeal; issue forfeited because Salazar did not raise or object at trial and cannot raise it for first time on appeal |
| Whether termination was in child’s best interest (adoptability and potential harm if returned) | Salazar argued potential-harm component was not independently proven and termination was premature given service compliance | DHS argued A.M. was adoptable and risks existed from McCollum’s untreated schizophrenia, appellant’s financial instability, reliance on family including sex-offender father, and long time in foster care | Affirmed. Court accepted adoptability and found sufficient evidence of potential harm and overall best-interest by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether statutory grounds for termination were proven (focus on "other factors" ground) | Salazar contended DHS failed to prove relevant statutory grounds and failed to exercise reasonable efforts on ICPC matters | DHS relied on Ark. Code §9-27-341 other-factors ground: post-petition issues (McCollum’s untreated mental illness, appellant’s continued financial dependence) that appellant failed to remedy despite services | Affirmed. Court found clear-and-convincing evidence of the other-factors ground and that appellant manifested incapacity/indifference to remedy subsequent issues |
| Whether DHS failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain ICPC approval, prejudicing appellant | Salazar argued DHS did not timely submit required background/drug documentation and thus prejudiced ICPC outcome | DHS maintained it submitted required information and that ICPC process requires receiving-state approval; trial court and orders found DHS made meaningful/ reasonable efforts | Trial court’s finding that DHS made reasonable and meaningful efforts was not clearly erroneous; appellant’s claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Vail v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 486 S.W.3d 229 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016) (standard of review for TPR appeals and requirement of clear-and-convincing proof)
- Mitchell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 430 S.W.3d 851 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (deference to trial-court findings in dependency matters)
- Anderson v. Douglas, 839 S.W.2d 196 (Ark. 1992) (definition of clear-and-convincing evidence)
- J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 947 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1997) (appellate review of trial-court findings)
- Yarborough v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 240 S.W.3d 626 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (when a finding is clearly erroneous)
- Singleton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 468 S.W.3d 809 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (best-interest factors: adoptability and potential harm)
- Ford v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 434 S.W.3d 378 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014) (purpose of TPR statute to provide permanency when return cannot occur in reasonable time)
- Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 201 S.W.3d 391 (Ark. 2005) (full compliance with case plan not dispositive; stability and safety are controlling concerns)
- Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 205 S.W.3d 778 (Ark. 2005) (child’s need for permanency may override parent's request for more time)