Saladrigas v. City of O'Fallon, 2020 IL App (5th) 190466

O’Fallon (a home‑rule municipality) enacted Ordinance No. 3653 authorizing impoundment of vehicles used in certain offenses and imposing an "administrative fee": $500 for Level I offenses (including DUI) and $250 for Level II offenses.
The ordinance’s preamble expressly states the administrative fees are "based upon the amount of resources expended" and intended to "help the police department recoup costs associated with processing certain arrests."
Rogelio Saladrigas was arrested for a Level I offense; his vehicle was impounded and he paid the $500 fee; he filed a class action alleging the $500 charge violates substantive due process because it is not reasonably related to actual costs.
O’Fallon moved for summary judgment, arguing the $500 charge is a punitive civil fine (not a fee) and therefore only subject to gross‑disproportionality review; the circuit court treated it as a fine and granted summary judgment for the city.
The appellate court reviewed the ordinance’s language de novo, concluded the municipality’s plain language and preamble demonstrate an intent to recoup costs (i.e., the charge is a fee), reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings on whether the fee reasonably relates to actual costs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the $500 impoundment charge a "fee" (cost‑recoupment) or a "fine" (punitive)?	The ordinance labels it an "administrative fee" and is intended to recoup costs; thus due‑process review requires a reasonable relationship to actual costs.	The charge functions as a punitive fine: it varies by offense seriousness, is tied to misconduct, and serves deterrence—so Eighth Amendment/gross‑disproportionality scrutiny applies.	The court held the charge is a fee—O’Fallon’s plain language and preamble showing recoupment control; some fine‑like attributes were inconclusive and did not override express intent.
Was summary judgment for O’Fallon appropriate?	Saladrigas argued factual issues remain about whether $500 bears a reasonable relation to actual costs, so SJ was improper.	O’Fallon contended characterizing the charge as a fine moots the fee reasonableness claim and supports SJ for the city.	The court reversed: because the charge is a fee, the circuit court erred in granting SJ on the basis it was a fine; remanded for determination whether amount reasonably relates to costs.

People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (explains fine vs. fee distinction and gross‑disproportionality test for fines)
People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244 (defines fees as charges to recoup government expenses)
People v. Gildart, 377 Ill. App. 3d 39 (addresses inquiry whether a monetary charge is a fee or fine)
People v. Ratliff, 282 Ill. App. 3d 707 (treated a $500 impoundment charge as a remedial fee)
Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 (ordinance construction reviewed de novo)
Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296 (statutory/construction rules apply to municipal ordinances)
First American Bank Corp. v. Henry, 239 Ill. 2d 511 (plain language of statute/ordinance is best evidence of intent)
Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2019 IL 122654 (summary judgment standard; de novo review)