Saiia Construction, LLC v. Terracon Consultants, Inc.
310 Ga. App. 713
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Saiia Construction sued Terracon for contractual indemnification, common-law indemnification, and contribution related to a defective retaining wall.
- Terracon provided soil-observation and testing services to Saiia under a written proposal signed by Terracon, including an indemnity provision in favor of Saiia.
- Terracon completed services on December 17, 2003; Saiia later settled a counterclaim against the owner/general contractor on April 16, 2010, paying approximately $183,000 and releasing liens.
- Saiia initially filed suit on November 2, 2009; Terracon moved for summary judgment arguing OCGA 9-3-25 barred the claims as time-barred.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Terracon; on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Jordan Jones and remanded for reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals held that (a) accrual occurred at the time of settlement, not its earlier filing, and (b) claims for common-law indemnification and contribution fall under OCGA 9-3-22, while contractual indemnification may fall under OCGA 9-3-24 if a complete written contract exists.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA 9-3-25 bars Saiia's claims. | Saiia argues 9-3-25 should not apply post-Newell Recycling. | Terracon asserts 9-3-25 applies unconditionally per Jordan Jones. | Not barred; 9-3-25 not controlling after Newell Recycling. |
| When did the cause of action accrue for indemnity/contribution? | Accrual occurred when written contract/indemnity rights arose, not at filing. | Accrual occurred earlier, potentially before settlement. | Accrual occurred at settlement date (April 16, 2010); filing within four years not barred. |
| Applicable statute of limitations for common-law indemnification and contribution. | These claims accrue under OCGA 9-3-22 (20-year) for rights arising by operation of law. | 9-3-25 could apply if treated as professional malpractice. | Common-law indemnification/contribution governed by 9-3-22; 9-3-25 inapplicable for these claims. |
| Whether contractual indemnification is governed by OCGA 9-3-24 or 9-3-25. | There may be a complete written contract for professional services invoking 9-3-24. | If viewed as malpractice claims, 9-3-25 may apply. | If a complete written contract exists, 9-3-24 governs contractual indemnification. |
Key Cases Cited
- Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 252 Ga.App. 361 (2001) (indemnity limitations tied to settlement or judgment timing)
- Davis v. Southern Exposition Mgmt. Co., 232 Ga.App. 773 (1998) (contractual accrual upon payment or settlement)
- Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga.App. 382 (2007) (contract accrual timing for indemnity duties)
- North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Thomason etc. Constr. Co., 157 Ga.App. 719 (1981) (indemnity accrual principles under operation of law)
- Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga.App. 525 (1994) (20-year limitation for contribution actions)
- Jordan Jones & Goulding v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, 299 Ga.App. 294 (2009) (limits on 9-3-25 for professional malpractice claims under a contract)
- Newell Recycling of Atlanta v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, 288 Ga. 236 (2010) (six-year written-contract standard for professional services; 9-3-24 applies)
- Jordan Jones & Goulding v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, 309 Ga.App. 717 (2011) (reaffirmed Newell Recycling approach at appellate level)