Sai v. Transportation Security Administration
843 F.3d 33
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Sai sued TSA, DHS, state and local defendants alleging disability-discrimination and sought court-appointed counsel under federal civil-rights statutes that authorize appointment (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1)).
- The statutory authorization permits appointment "in such circumstances as the court may deem just," but provides no funding; district courts thus exercise broad discretion.
- The district court denied Sai's request for appointed counsel; Sai sought interlocutory review of that denial as a collateral order.
- The First Circuit acknowledged a circuit split on whether denials of appointed counsel are immediately appealable collateral orders but treated the question on the merits.
- The court applied precedent (Appleby and related cases) and factors courts consider in appointment decisions (merits, ability to pay, efforts to obtain counsel, availability of counsel, and pro se capacity), emphasizing they are dynamic and subject to reassessment as the case proceeds.
- The Court dismissed the interlocutory appeal, holding that denial of appointed counsel is generally non-final and not properly reviewed as a collateral order, while noting such denials remain reviewable after final judgment and that a clear record of the district court’s reasons is important for appellate review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of appointed counsel under federal anti-discrimination statutes is immediately appealable as a collateral order | Sai argued the denial should be immediately reviewable as a collateral order | Defendants argued the denial is interlocutory, discretionary, and not appealable until final judgment | Denial is not an immediately appealable collateral order; interlocutory appeal dismissed |
| Whether appointment decisions under statutes like 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3 and 12188 are analogous to § 1915(e) appointment refusals | Sai implicitly urged comparable reviewability to § 1915(e) appointment denials | Defendants contended the statutory appointment context differs and is discretionary | Court declined to equate them for automatic collateral-order review and applied Appleby factors instead |
| What factors should guide appointment decisions and their reviewability | Sai argued the record supported appointment (implied) | Defendants emphasized district-court discretion and resource constraints | Court reiterated non-exhaustive factors (merits, ability to pay, diligence, availability, pro se capacity) and said they can change over time |
| How appellate review should proceed if appointment is wrongly denied | Sai sought immediate relief on appeal | Defendants relied on final-judgment rule and practical reassessment mechanisms | Court said wrongful denials can be remedied on appeal from final judgment and appellate courts can vacate prejudice or provide relief; emphasized need for clear district-court reasoning in the record |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing practical difficulties and factors in appointing volunteer counsel)
- Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1983) (denial of appointed counsel under § 1915(e) is non-final and reconsiderable as case develops)
- Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (collecting cases on interlocutory reviewability of appointment denials)
- Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (identifying key appointment factors and remanding where district court failed to state reasons)