Safari Club International v. Salazar
404 U.S. App. D.C. 171
| D.C. Cir. | 2013Background
- Center for Biological Diversity petitioned in 2005 to list the polar bear under the ESA; FWS conducted a three-year rulemaking and listed the polar bear as threatened in 2008 based on likely future endangered status due to climate-driven sea-ice loss.
- Industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule; challenges were consolidated in a DC District Court Multidistrict Litigation, where the District Court granted summary judgment for FWS.
- Appellants argued the Listing Rule was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, contending deficiencies in the rulemaking process and the decision itself.
- The District Court remanded briefly on the issue of how the ESA’s endangered vs. threatened classifications should be read, but ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of FWS.
- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reviews for reasoned decisionmaking, deferring to agency expertise, and upholding FWS’s explanation and determination that the polar bear is threatened throughout its range.
- The court concluded that the Listing Rule’s three-part framework (dependence on sea ice, declining sea ice, and climate-driven habitat loss) was adequately supported and that challenges were policy disagreements rather than legal defects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FWS adequately explained how habitat loss leads to endangerment | Appellants contend FWS failed to link habitat loss to endangered status. | FWS provided a clear, rational explanation connecting sea-ice loss to demographic declines; not arbitrary. | Yes; adequate explanation supported. |
| Whether listing applies range-wide rather than population-specific | Appellants argue DPS Policy should yield population-specific listing. | FWS reasonably concluded single range-wide listing; DPS boundaries not dispositive here. | Yes; range-wide listing upheld. |
| Whether USGS population models were properly relied upon | Appellants claim models were limited and unreliable for listing. | Models used narrowly to confirm general trends; full explanations provided. | Yes; narrow reliance not arbitrary. |
| Whether FWS correctly defined 'likely' and applied it to ‘foreseeable future’ | Appellants claim IPCC definition was misapplied or relied upon improperly. | FWS used ordinary meaning of 'likely'; IPCC definition not binding here. | Yes; ordinary meaning applied. |
| Whether FWS properly considered Canada and complied with Section 4(i) | Canada conservation efforts and Alaska’s Section 4(i) concerns were mishandled. | FWS adequately considered foreign efforts; Alaska's objections were sufficiently addressed. | Yes; FWS satisfied 4(i) and took foreign efforts into account. |
Key Cases Cited
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 463 U.S. 29 (U.S. 1983) (arbitrary and capricious review; need for rational connection between facts and decision)
- Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (U.S. 1989) (technical expertise warranted deference in agency decisions)
- Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing decisions must be based on best available data and reasoned analysis)
- Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (narrow review of agency modeling; deference to expert agency judgment)
- Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (U.S. 1994) (agency interpretations of its own regulations receive limited deference)