Safari Club International v. Salazar, 403 U.S. App. D.C. 276

The ESA creates listing timelines and protects species only after formal listing; hunting is unlawful only for listed species.
Three candidate species (New England cottontail, greater sage grouse, lesser prairie-chicken) appear on the 2010 CNOR as warranted but precluded.
In 2010-2011, Guardians and Center sued Service; settlements were reached in May and June 2011 detailing deadlines and restrictions on further suits.
Safari Club moved to intervene in June 2011 to oppose the settlements, asserting it had an interest in hunting those species.
The district court denied intervention; it approved the settlements and the Safari Club appeals.
The court reviews standing de novo to determine intervention as of right and assesses permissive intervention for potential delay and prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Safari Club has standing to intervene as of right.	Safari Club asserts procedural rights under ESA justify standing.	Safari Club failed to show a protected procedural right or imminent injury tied to listing delay.	Safari Club lacks standing; no procedural right designed to protect its interest.
Whether the warranted-but-precluded process itself supports intervention.	The process protects its hunting interests by delaying listings.	ESA does not create a standing-altering procedure for intervenors with hunting interests.	No standing via warranted-but-precluded procedure; the process cannot be used to block listing.
Whether the district court should have allowed permissive intervention.	Claims on reasonableness and public interest overlap with settlement review.	Late intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice; standing issues bar permissive intervention.	District court did not abuse discretion; we decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction given unresolved standing.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (procedural rights can support standing when designed to protect concrete interests)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural injuries may relax immediacy/redressability requirements)
National Parks Conserv. Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (procedural injury doctrine applied to environmental rulemaking)
Center for Law & Education v. Dep’t of Education, 396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (standing where rulemaking procedures do not protect asserted interests)
In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (pendant jurisdiction and standing considerations in intervention)
Alt. Research & Dev. Found. v. Veneman, 262 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (standing requirements for intervention are constrained by Article III)
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Article III standing required for intervention as of right)
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explains Rule 24 intervenor standards and standing overlap)
City of Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (underlying rationale for Rule 24 standing requirements)