Safari Club Int'l v. Lawrence Rudolph
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2416
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Rudolph, a longtime Safari Club International (SCI) member and former president, secretly audio/video recorded a five-hour lunch conversation with SCI president John Whipple at a public restaurant and later posted edited and unedited videos online.
- Whipple (now through his successor-in-interest, Joan Whipple) and SCI sued Rudolph in California state court asserting: statutory invasion of privacy (Cal. Penal Code § 632), negligence per se based on § 632, and common-law intrusion upon seclusion, among other claims. The case was removed to federal court.
- Rudolph moved to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16); the district court granted the motion as to several claims but denied it as to the three privacy-related claims. Rudolph appealed.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit (affirming) considered (1) whether Rudolph’s recording was activity “in furtherance” of protected speech/petitioning and (2) whether plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of prevailing on the § 632, negligence per se, and common-law invasion claims.
- The court held Rudolph’s recording qualified as protected conduct (newsgathering / conduct furthering free speech on an issue of public interest), but plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence—principally Whipple’s declaration—to show a triable issue that the conversation was a confidential communication and that the recordings were intrusive and highly offensive. The anti-SLAPP motion was therefore properly denied as to those three claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rudolph’s recording "arises from" protected petition/speech (anti-SLAPP step 1) | Recording was not shielded because it was illegal under § 632 | Recording was newsgathering and conduct in furtherance of free speech on an organizational/governance public issue | Held: Recording is protected conduct under § 425.16(e)(4); anti-SLAPP step 1 met |
| Whether plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of prevailing on statutory invasion (§ 632) | Whipple’s declaration shows he reasonably expected privacy and did not consent; recording fits § 632’s proscription | Public restaurant setting precludes objectively reasonable expectation of privacy; video shows no confidentiality | Held: Plaintiffs met the minimal prima facie showing; triable fact exists on objective expectation of privacy |
| Whether plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of prevailing on negligence per se (based on § 632) | Violation of § 632 supports negligence per se, injury alleged, statute protects people whose conversations are secretly recorded | If § 632 not violated, negligence per se fails | Held: Plaintiffs met burden because § 632 violation is plausibly shown; negligence per se survives anti-SLAPP |
| Whether plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of prevailing on common-law intrusion upon seclusion | Secret recording using friendship as subterfuge was an intrusion into a private conversation and sufficiently offensive | Public location and adversarial litigation context negate reasonable expectation / offensiveness | Held: Plaintiffs met the low threshold to show triable issues on intrusion and offensiveness; claim survives anti-SLAPP |
Key Cases Cited
- Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (anti-SLAPP burden-shifting and standard for reasonable probability of prevailing)
- Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (surreptitious newsgathering can be conduct in furtherance of free speech)
- Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766 (Cal. 2002) (objective-reasonableness test for expectation of privacy under § 632)
- Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 907 (Cal. 1999) (privacy is relative; public location does not automatically defeat an intrusion claim)
- Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272 (Cal. 2009) (elements of common-law intrusion and factors for offensiveness)
- Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of anti-SLAPP denials)
