Saeb Mokdad v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III
876 F.3d 167
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Saeb Mokdad, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Dearborn, MI, sued federal officials after three incidents in which he was denied boarding on flights to Lebanon, alleging he was on the No Fly List and seeking removal and procedural protections.
- The district court initially dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; this court reversed, limited to the narrow claim challenging TSC placement on the No Fly List, and remanded.
- On remand, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) re-examined Mokdad’s DHS TRIP request, sent a letter stating he was not on the No Fly List, and agreed to a formal declaration that he is not and will not be placed on the No Fly List based on currently available information.
- The district court ordered TSC to file that declaration; TSC complied and moved to dismiss as moot. Mokdad appealed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
- The Sixth Circuit concluded TSC’s declaration resolved the specific claim remanded—Mokdad’s alleged placement on the No Fly List—and therefore no live case or controversy remained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mokdad’s challenge to his placement on the No Fly List remains a live Article III controversy | Mokdad argued continuing boarding delays show ongoing injury plausibly linked to initial No Fly List placement, so relief still necessary | TSC argued it has declared Mokdad is not on and will not be placed on the No Fly List based on current information, resolving the claim | Claim is moot: TSC’s declaration resolved the narrow issue remanded, leaving no relief the court can grant |
| Whether the voluntary-cessation doctrine prevents mootness | Mokdad asserted TSC could resume the challenged conduct after declaring cessation, so case should not be moot | TSC (and the court) argued its actions were compelled by court order and stipulation, not unilateral voluntary cessation | Voluntary-cessation doctrine does not apply because TSC’s actions were taken to comply with court order and court-incorporated stipulation |
| Whether the court should order removal from all watchlists (relying on Ibrahim) | Mokdad urged the court to follow Ibrahim and order removal from any list preventing travel | Government noted Mokdad’s claim was limited to TSC No Fly List; he did not name other lists or defendants or present evidence of other watchlist entries | Court rejected Ibrahim analogy: Mokdad’s claim was narrowly limited to TSC No Fly List; relief beyond that requires new claims/defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (Article III mootness—case becomes moot when issues are no longer live)
- Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam) (standing and mootness principles)
- Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) (no relief available when events make it impossible for court to grant effectual relief)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (voluntary cessation doctrine and its rationale)
- American Bar Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 636 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing voluntary from compelled government action)
- Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)