Sackett v. EPA
598 U.S. 651
SCOTUS2023Background
- Michael and Chantell Sackett filled and graded a lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, to prepare for building a house. EPA issued a compliance order, asserting the property contained wetlands that are "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act (CWA), and threatened large daily penalties.
- EPA’s theory: the Sackett wetlands were "adjacent" to an unnamed tributary/ditch that led to a creek and then to Priest Lake (an intrastate water the Agency treats as traditionally navigable); EPA relied on a "significant nexus" analysis that aggregated nearby wetlands.
- The Sacketts sued under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking judicial review of the compliance order; after procedural litigation, the District Court granted summary judgment to EPA, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to define the outer limits of the CWA phrase "the waters of the United States," especially as applied to wetlands adjacent to other waters.
- The Court majority (Alito) adopts the Rapanos plurality approach: CWA "waters" are relatively permanent bodies (streams, rivers, lakes, oceans) and include only adjacent wetlands that are "indistinguishable" from those waters because of a continuous surface connection.
- Result: the Ninth Circuit judgment reversed and remanded; the Sackett wetlands were held not to be "waters of the United States" under the continuous-surface-connection test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sackett) | Defendant's Argument (EPA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Scope of "waters of the United States" in CWA §1362(7) | "Waters" should not reach the Sacketts' wetlands; ordinary meaning excludes land features lacking continuous water bodies. | Broad reading: "waters" can include wetlands and any waters affecting interstate commerce. | Court: "waters" refers to relatively permanent standing or continuously flowing bodies (streams, rivers, lakes, oceans); not all wet or intermittently wet land. |
| 2) Whether "adjacent" wetlands are covered by CWA absent continuous surface connection | Sackett: wetlands no continuous surface connection to covered waters → not covered. | EPA: "adjacent" includes wetlands "neighboring" covered waters; may be separated by berms/dikes; coverage via "significant nexus." | Court: To be covered an adjacent wetland must have a continuous surface connection to a water that is itself a water of the United States (i.e., indistinguishable from that water). |
| 3) Role of the "significant nexus" test (Kennedy concurrence in Rapanos) | Sackett: test is too vague and stretches CWA beyond text. | EPA: significant-nexus test properly identifies wetlands that affect chemical, physical, biological integrity of traditional navigable waters and thus are covered. | Court: Rejected agency's reliance on significant-nexus as definitional; test not grounded in §1362(7) and raises vagueness and federalism concerns—no deference. |
| 4) Application to Sacketts' property | Their wetlands are distinguishable (separated by road/ditch) and lack continuous surface connection to a qualifying relatively permanent water → no jurisdiction. | EPA: aggregated nearby wetland complexes and asserted a significant nexus to Priest Lake; asserted jurisdiction and penalties. | Court: Sackett property wetlands are not "waters of the United States" under the continuous-surface-connection rule; Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality and Kennedy concurrence framed competing tests for CWA wetlands jurisdiction)
- United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (deference to Corps re: wetlands that actually abut navigable waters)
- Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (CWA does not reach isolated, nonadjacent intrastate ponds; §1344(g)(1) does not conclusively define "navigable waters")
- The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871) (classic definition of "navigable waters of the United States" as waters used or susceptible for interstate commerce)
- United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (navigability test includes waters that could be made usable for commerce)
- Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900) (wetlands generally not part of "navigable waters" absent interstate commerce use)