Sabrina C. v. Fortin
170 A.3d 100
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- In Nov. 2015 the trial court granted Sabrina C. a one-year civil protection order after crediting her testimony that Lucas Fortin sexually assaulted her; order expired Nov. 24, 2016.
- Fortin (initially pro se, later counsel) filed a motion to vacate/modify the order in Mar. 2016 relying primarily on post-judgment developments (police declined to charge him; plaintiff’s social-media comments).
- The trial court denied the motion (oral ruling cited untimeliness and lack of challenge to the order’s validity); Fortin moved to reargue and amended his motions; court denied reargument and awarded plaintiff $1,500 in attorney’s fees as a sanction under the bad-faith exception.
- Plaintiff then moved (Oct. 2016) to extend the protection order one more year; at the Nov. 15, 2016 hearing no testimony or new evidence was presented, and the court granted the extension based on its view that the need for protection "still exists."
- On appeal the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed denial of the vacatur motion but reversed the fee award and the extension, remanding with directions to vacate both.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Denial of motion to vacate/modify judgment | Plaintiff: motion was untimely and offered no good/compelling reason to open judgment | Fortin: motion was timely (filed within 4 months) and new facts (no criminal charges) justified vacatur/modification | Court: Denial affirmed — trial court’s initial timeliness error was harmless because it independently found no good or compelling reason to open the judgment and did not abuse discretion |
| 2. Whether articulation substituted new grounds for denial | Plaintiff: court’s later articulation simply clarified reasons for denying relief | Fortin: articulation changed the ground after the fact, impermissibly substituting new rationale | Held: No improper substitution; oral ruling and articulation are reconcilable (both show court unconvinced by Fortin’s proffered basis) |
| 3. Award of attorney’s fees under bad-faith exception | Plaintiff: duplicative, repetitive filings victimized her and warranted fees under court’s inherent authority | Fortin: filings were colorable or explained; no clear bad faith; court lacked specific findings required for bad-faith sanctions | Held: Reversed — trial court failed to make the required high-degree-of-specificity findings that claims were entirely without color and made in bad faith; fee award vacated |
| 4. Extension of protection order for additional year | Plaintiff: statute authorizes extension where applicant remains a victim of sexual assault and procedural prerequisites met; argued no further evidence of continuing need required | Fortin: statutory text requires proof that the need for protection "still exists" consistent with subsection (a); plaintiff must present evidence of continuing need | Held: Reversed — court erred by granting extension without evidentiary showing of a continuing need for protection; extension vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834 (Conn. 2004) (bad-faith sanctions require claims entirely without color and proof of bad faith)
- JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Eldon, 144 Conn. App. 260 (Conn. App. 2013) (standards governing motions to open judgments and appellate review)
- Rinfret v. Porter, 173 Conn. App. 498 (Conn. App. 2017) (requires high degree of specificity in factual findings for bad-faith fee awards)
- Keller v. Keller, 167 Conn. App. 138 (Conn. App. 2016) (definition of a colorable claim for bad-faith analysis)