Saber Health Care v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2020 Ohio 4044

Thomas Adams applied for Medicaid while represented by Saber Health Care d/b/a Eagle Creek (his authorized representative); Adams died before the application was finally decided.
ODJFS denied Adams’s Medicaid application after a state hearing; Eagle Creek (as authorized representative) pursued administrative appeals.
Adams (though deceased) and later Eagle Creek filed notices of appeal to the Adams County Common Pleas Court; at the time of filing, no personal or estate administrator had been appointed.
The probate court appointed Jared B. Chamberlain as special administrator after the notice of appeal was filed.
ODJFS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing/jurisdiction.
The Fourth District affirmed, holding that an authorized representative’s authority lapses at death and that Saber was not an “appellant” under R.C. 5101.35 when it filed the common-pleas appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Saber (a nursing provider/authorized representative) had standing as an “appellant” under R.C. 5101.35 to appeal ODJFS’s denial after Adams’s death	Saber: its designation as Adams’s authorized representative and its pecuniary interest (nonpayment for services) let it appeal under R.C. 119.12 and §5101.35	ODJFS: only an applicant/participant/recipient (or a properly appointed personal representative after death) qualifies as an “appellant” under R.C. 5101.35; an authorized representative’s authority lapses at death	Held: Saber was not an “appellant” under R.C. 5101.35; its authorization lapsed on Adams’s death and it lacked standing; appeal dismissed
Whether Saber could invoke R.C. 119.12 as a “party” to appeal independent of R.C. 5101.35	Saber: even if §5101.35 applies, Saber qualifies as a “party” under R.C. 119.12 because the administrative order adversely affected its pecuniary interests	ODJFS: §5101.35 defines who may appeal to common pleas; Saber is not in that statutory class, so §119.12 does not save its appeal	Held: Court did not reach the merits of §119.12 argument because Saber failed to qualify as an “appellant” under §5101.35; the §119.12 issue was moot

Santa v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv., 136 Ohio App.3d 190 (8th Dist. 2000) (power of attorney lapses at death; agent lacks authority to pursue postmortem Medicaid claim)
Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St.3d 125 (Ohio 1983) (an estate administrator stands in the decedent’s shoes and is proper party after death)
Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bar’s Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 24 (Ohio 1992) (right to appeal administrative orders is statutory and not automatic)
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13 (Ohio 2012) (standing is assessed as of commencement of suit)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (party’s standing must exist at commencement of suit)