Saban Rent-A-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 434 P.3d 1168

Arizona created the Arizona Tourism and Sports Authority (AzSTA) to fund stadium and tourism projects in Maricopa County; projects are financed by voter-approved taxes/surcharges.
Voters approved a car-rental surcharge (greater of $2.50/rental or 3.25% of gross proceeds; $2.50 per rental flows to the Maricopa County Stadium District; remainder to AzSTA). Rental companies may pass the surcharge to customers.
Saban Rent‑A‑Car paid the surcharge, sought refunds from ADOR, sued in tax court, and obtained class certification for payors from Sept 2005–Mar 2008; AzSTA intervened.
The tax court held the surcharge violated Arizona Constitution article 9 § 14 (anti‑diversion) but not the dormant Commerce Clause, ordered refunds and permitted ADOR to recoup from AzSTA.
The court of appeals affirmed no dormant Commerce Clause violation but reversed on the anti‑diversion claim, upholding the surcharge; the Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the surcharge violates the dormant Commerce Clause	Saban: Voters intended to target nonresident visitors, showing discriminatory intent that burdens interstate commerce	ADOR/AzSTA: Surcharge is even‑handed, applies to in‑state and out‑of‑state alike, and any intent that visitors bear more does not equal discriminatory intent	Court: No discriminatory intent; surcharge is neutral on its face and does not differentiate in‑state vs out‑of‑state interests — no Commerce Clause violation
Whether the surcharge violates Arizona Constitution art. 9 § 14 (anti‑diversion)	Saban: "Relating to ... operation or use of vehicles" covers taxes that fall on vehicle renters; surcharge revenues therefore must fund highways	ADOR/AzSTA: "Relating to" is narrower — taxes must be prerequisites to or triggered by legal operation/use (e.g., registration, fuel); surcharge is a business excise, not a road‑use prerequisite	Court: Adopts narrower reading — clause covers taxes prerequisite to or triggered by legal vehicle operation/use; surcharge is a business excise and does not fall within art. 9 § 14, so no anti‑diversion violation

Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (framework distinguishing discriminatory laws from evenhanded laws with incidental interstate effects)
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (balancing test for nondiscriminatory laws that incidentally burden interstate commerce)
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (tax that disproportionately falls on nonresidents may nonetheless be valid if evenhanded and based on in‑state activities)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (invalidated facially discriminatory tax scheme that targeted nonresident users)
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of the Treasury, 490 U.S. 66 (1989) (definitions of discriminatory taxes under Commerce Clause)
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (dormant Commerce Clause objective to prevent states from conferring preferential advantages on residents)
Saban Rent‑A‑Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 244 Ariz. 293 (App. 2018) (court of appeals decision addressing both Commerce Clause and anti‑diversion challenges)