Saalwaechter v. Carroll, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 69

Background

In 2007–08 Carroll represented Saalwaechter in a complex pawn-shop and real-estate transaction; disputes followed when Carroll acquired pawn assets and formed Evansville Pawn LLC.
DFI refused to renew Evansville Pawn’s license for alleged straw licensing and problems with manager John Jones; Saalwaechter later formed Fares Pawn and sought a license.
DFI initially denied Saalwaechter’s license because of Jones; after administrative proceedings and a memorandum of understanding (agreeing not to employ Jones), DFI granted a license in early 2010.
Saalwaechter sued Carroll in 2010 for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence; that case was dismissed for inactivity.
In 2015 Saalwaechter filed a second, substantively identical suit; Carroll moved for summary judgment arguing KRS 413.245’s one‑year statute of limitations barred the claims.
Trial court granted summary judgment, holding the malpractice/contract claims accrued in 2007–08 (occurrence), so the 2015 suit was time‑barred; this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did malpractice/ fiduciary claims accrue under KRS 413.245?	Claims didn’t accrue until damages became "fixed and non‑speculative" — assertedly on July 14, 2014 when the 7th Cir. denied his appeal, so the 2015 suit is timely.	Accrual occurred in 2007–08 when Carroll’s acts produced irrevocable injury and Saalwaechter knew he was harmed; suit filed in 2015 is too late.	Accrual occurred in 2007–08; 2015 complaint barred by one‑year statute.
Does the Broadbent/Wheatley rule delay accrual until full damages known?	Broadbent/Wheatley require waiting until damages are fixed; Saalwaechter says damages weren’t fixed until his federal litigation was final.	Those cases don’t require a precise dollar amount; "fixed and non‑speculative" means certainty that damages will flow, not quantification.	Court rejects plaintiff’s reading; damages were irrevocable in 2007–08 so discovery/accrual occurred then.
Are the contract claims governed by the 1‑year professional statute or longer contract statutes?	The written contract was not an engagement letter and included nonlegal obligations, so a longer limitations period (e.g., 15 years) should apply.	The claims arise from acts by a professional rendering professional services, so KRS 413.245 governs regardless of task nature.	Contract claims are governed by KRS 413.245 (one‑year) because they arise from professional services.
Should public policy or mitigation efforts toll/override the statute?	Tolling/remand warranted because plaintiff tried to mitigate damages by litigating against DFI; fairness favors allowing suit.	Federal litigation was collateral and did not involve Carroll; mitigation does not toll the professional statute.	Court declines public‑policy exception; federal case was unrelated to Carroll so no tolling.

Key Cases Cited

Fares Pawn, LLC v. Indiana Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2014) (background on pawn‑license dispute)
Broadbent v. Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith, 882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1994) (discusses accrual and "fixed and non‑speculative" damages)
Wheatley v. Meade County Bank, 910 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1995) (accrual/damage certainty rule in malpractice context)
Pedigo v. Breen, 169 S.W.3d 831 (Ky. 2004) (accrual requires negligence and reasonably ascertainable damages)
Matherly Land Surveying, Inc. v. Gardiner Park Dev., 230 S.W.3d 586 (Ky. 2007) (professional‑services claims governed by KRS 413.245 even when contractual)
Michels v. Sklavos, 869 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1994) (statute triggered by an identifiable event — irrevocable non‑speculative injury)
Vandevelde v. Falls City Builders, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. App. 1988) (status of professional, not nature of task, brings claim under professional statute)
Steelvest v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) (summary‑judgment standard)
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996) (standard of review for summary judgment)