Saad v. Village Of Orland Park, 1:11-cv-07419

Plaintiffs Asma Saad and Tobacco House, Inc. sue the Village of Orland Park asserting equal protection and due process challenges to the Smoking Ban Ordinance and its exemption provision.
The exemption allows indoor smoking at Belicoso Cigar Lounge if the current owner or in-control person holds a valid tobacco dealer license and operates at the specified location; Saad does not hold such a license.
Ghaddar, former owner, pleaded guilty to federal crimes on Sept. 1, 2011; the same day he transferred Tobacco House licenses to Saad and Saad became president and registered agent later that month.
The Village revoked Tobacco House’s business license in November 2011 citing Ghaddar’s violations and the loss of exemption due to ownership/control changes; Saad’s general business license application was not granted.
Plaintiffs move under Rule 12(b)(6); the court applies the standard for dismissal without converting to summary judgment and analyzes whether the complaint plausibly states claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Class-of-one equal protection claim viability	Saad alleges selective enforcement unjustly favored others.	No rational basis; or no plausible comparator showing intentional discrimination.	Dismissed; no plausible class-of-one claim.
National origin discrimination claim viability	Saad’s Arab-American descent shows illegitimate animus behind license denial.	Allegations fail under Twombly/Iqbal and lack plausible discrimination evidence.	Dismissed; no plausible intentional national-origin discrimination.
Vagueness challenge to exemption provision	Exemption is unconstitutionally vague as applied to ownership transfer.	Ordinance provides explicit standards; economic regulation with explicit scope.	Dismissed; ordinance sufficiently explicit as applied; not vague.

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (U.S. 2008) (equal protection; rational basis when not involving fundamental rights)
LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (selective enforcement and similarly situated comparison standards)
McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2004) (purpose and rational basis in equal protection challenges)
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (U.S. 2000) (class-of-one standard and irrational/arbitrary government action)
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (U.S. 1979) (equal protection classifications must be rationally related to a government purpose)
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1982) (vagueness standard for economic regulation; less strict for economic regulation)
United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2012) ( vagueness and due process under Seventh Circuit approach)
Plummer v. United States, 581 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2009) (applied vagueness analysis to statutes in context)
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards; pretext considerations)
Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (intentional discrimination and rational basis standard; en banc discussion)