S. Vladimirsky v. The SD of Philadelphia The SD of Philadelphia v. S. Vladimirsky
144 A.3d 986
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2016Background
- Serge Vladimirsky, a tenured social-studies teacher in the School District of Philadelphia, was the subject of incidents on Feb. 17 and Mar. 9, 2011 (verbal altercation and a physical confrontation recorded on video). Administrators recommended termination after investigations and conferences.
- On July 20, 2011 the District (administration) sent a letter recommending immediate termination, directing payroll adjustments; Vladimirsky’s pay stopped after the 2010–2011 school year. The letter invited him to request an SRC hearing.
- Vladimirsky requested a hearing; the SRC hearing occurred Nov. 28, 2011 before Hearing Officer White. The SRC adopted the hearing officer’s findings by resolution on Mar. 15, 2012, retroactively making the termination effective July 20, 2011.
- Vladimirsky appealed to the Acting Secretary of Education, who reinstated him to the position as of July 20, 2011 through Mar. 15, 2012 but sustained the SRC’s dismissal; the District and Vladimirsky appealed to this Court.
- The Commonwealth Court found the District’s July 20, 2011 action to be an administrative termination (not SRC action), concluded the District failed to comply with mandatory School Code procedures (Section 1127), and held that the noncompliance violated Vladimirsky’s due process rights; the court reversed the Acting Secretary and ordered reinstatement with back pay (subject to mitigation) and remanded to calculate damages.
Issues
| Issue | Vladimirsky's Argument | School District's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Did the District comply with School Code dismissal procedures (Sect. 1127) before terminating a tenured professional? | The July 20, 2011 letter effected an immediate termination without SRC resolution or required pre-hearing board action, so the dismissal was void ab initio. | The letter was a suspension pending hearing or was a proper administrative step; the SRC later ratified dismissal. | Held: District failed to follow Section 1127; administration terminated employment before SRC acted, so dismissal was invalid. |
| 2) Did the procedural failure deny Vladimirsky due process? | Yes; as a tenured employee he had a property interest and the statutory procedural safeguards were not observed, constituting deprivation without due process. | No; termination did not occur until SRC vote (Mar. 15, 2012), so District provided required process. | Held: Due process violated; dismissal date cannot pre-date board action and retroactive ratification does not cure the defect. |
| 3) Would a pre-charge SRC resolution or other pre-hearing action have violated impartiality; and is remand an appropriate remedy (rather than reinstatement)? | N/A (primary relief sought is that the original termination be void and reinstatement with back pay). | A pre-hearing board resolution finding sufficient evidence would have been permissible and could cure defects; if defects existed, remand for a new hearing is the proper fix. | Held: Pre-charge resolution is consistent with precedents (Patchel/Pittenger); but because the District failed to act before administratively terminating employment, the defect is fatal and reinstatement with back pay (less mitigation) is required rather than mere remand. |
| 4) Did delay in the Acting Secretary’s decision or Hearing Officer White’s District ties create an appearance of impropriety/bias denying due process? | Delay (two years) and hearing officer’s District role created appearance of impropriety and commingling prosecutorial/adjudicative functions. | No demonstrable prejudice from delay; hearing officer did not act as prosecutor in this case. | Held: No showing of prejudice from delay; no evidence hearing officer prosecuted the case; even if some commingling existed, de novo review by the Secretary cures that concern. |
Key Cases Cited
- Neshaminy Fed’n of Teachers v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 462 A.2d 629 (Pa. 1983) (tenured-teacher dismissals are statutorily limited and statutory procedures must be strictly followed)
- Pittenger v. Abington Sch. Dist., 305 A.2d 382 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) (administrative demotion/dismissal before board action cannot be ratified after the fact; board could have cured defect by pre-hearing resolution)
- Patchel v. Wilkinsburg Sch. Dist., 400 A.2d 229 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (Section 1127 requires the board to resolve to dismiss and furnish charges prior to the hearing)
- Swink’s Case, 200 A. 200 (Pa. Super. 1938) (dismissing a teacher without statutory procedures is a fatal defect requiring reversal)
- Lyness v. State Bd. of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992) (adjudicatory function tainted where prosecuting entity is substantially involved in adjudication; appearance of bias can violate due process)
- Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1972) (property interests in public employment derive from state law and trigger constitutional due process protections)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1985) (procedural due process requires adequate procedures before depriving property interests)