S.T. v. R.W., 192 A.3d 1155

Mother (incarcerated) and Father share a nine-year-old daughter; Mother has been imprisoned since 2014 with earliest release in 2019 and had not spoken to the child since incarceration began.
Mother filed a "Motion for Contact via Telephone and Correspondence." The trial court scheduled a hearing but limited Mother's participation to submitting a pre‑hearing written statement and did not notify her of the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to attend.
The court conducted a brief ex parte hearing with Father present, sua sponte suspended Mother’s physical custody, denied telephone contact, allowed letter correspondence (subject to screening), and awarded Father sole legal custody.
Trial court opinion relied in part on repealed custody statutes and did not interview the child or fully apply the current 16 statutory best‑interest factors in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), nor the prison‑specific considerations from Etter.
On appeal, the Superior Court found the procedure denied Mother meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard, misapplied current Custody Law, vacated the order, and remanded for a new hearing with appropriate process and statutory analysis.

Issue	Mother's Argument	Father's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court violated due process by limiting Mother's participation to a written statement and not advising her of the right to request to attend by writ	Mother: She was denied meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard and thus suffered extreme prejudice and loss of parental rights	Father: Court followed precedent permitting written submissions from incarcerated parents; transporting prisoner is burdensome	Held: Reversible error. Court must notify incarcerated parents of right to seek a writ and afford a meaningful opportunity to be heard (telephonic/video testimony now expected when feasible)
Whether the trial court properly applied current Custody Law (including § 5328(a) factors) in denying telephone contact and awarding sole legal custody	Mother: Trial court failed to analyze all relevant § 5328(a) factors (including child preference and prison‑specific considerations) and improperly used repealed law	Father: Incarceration and logistics justify limiting contact; prior case law supports presumption against visitation in prison cases	Held: Trial court misapplied the law. Requests by incarcerated parents constitute a form of custody (supervised physical custody) and the court must evaluate all relevant § 5328(a) factors (including Etter factors via § 5328(a)(16)) before modifying physical or legal custody; remanded for proper analysis

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parents have fundamental liberty interest in making child‑rearing decisions)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (framework for balancing procedural due process protections)
Vanaman v. Cowgill, 526 A.2d 1226 (Pa. Super. 1987) (incarcerated party must be given notice of right to request transportation for attendance; ex parte hearing reversible)
Sullivan v. Shaw, 650 A.2d 882 (Pa. Super. 1994) (incarcerated petitioner entitled to hearing and notice of right to seek habeas writ; written submission alone previously accepted but limited)
Etter v. Rose, 684 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. 1996) (enumerated prison‑specific visitation factors to consider)
J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260 (Pa. Super. 2017) (procedural due process requires adequate notice, opportunity to be heard, and ability to defend before an impartial tribunal)
M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083 (Pa. Super. 2017) (trial courts must consider Etter/prison‑specific factors under § 5328(a)(16) and cannot summarily deny contact without full factor analysis)