S. H. v. United States
853 F.3d 1056
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- The Holts, a USAF family, were approved for command-sponsored relocation from California to Rota, Spain while Mrs. Holt was pregnant; Dr. Stahlman cleared them despite her history of preterm deliveries.
- At ~31 weeks in Spain, Mrs. Holt delivered S.H. prematurely; S.H. suffered a brain white-matter injury (periventricular leukomalacia), neonatal complications, seizures, and developmental delays while the family remained in Spain.
- An MRI in Spain and several Spanish physicians identified neurologic injury; some Spanish doctors suspected or diagnosed cerebral palsy before the family returned to the U.S. in 2006.
- After returning to the U.S., S.H. was definitively diagnosed with cerebral palsy (tetraplegia) in South Carolina; the Holts sued the United States under the FTCA for negligent approval of overseas travel, alleging S.H.’s cerebral palsy resulted from the premature birth in Spain.
- The district court found the injury occurred in South Carolina, awarded $10,409,700, and the government appealed challenging jurisdiction under the FTCA’s foreign-country exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the Holts’ claims arose in Spain because the harmful force first impinged on S.H.’s body there; thus § 2680(k) bars the suit and the case must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where was the injury "suffered" for § 2680(k) (foreign-country exception)? | Injury (cerebral palsy) first occurred/was diagnosable in the U.S.; accrual/diagnosis location governs. | Injury was suffered where the harmful force first impinged (Spain); foreign-country exception bars claims arising there. | Injury occurs where harm first impinges on the body (Spain); § 2680(k) bars the FTCA claim. |
| Whether state accrual law controls the location-of-injury analysis | California accrual law should determine where injury occurred. | Federal law and lex loci delicti (as of FTCA enactment) govern the scope of the exclusion. | Federal law controls; lex loci delicti (place of wrong) applies, not state accrual rules. |
| Whether an administrative claim filed in Spain affects scope/timing of the claim | Diagnosis later in U.S. means the claim arose in the U.S. | Filing an administrative claim in Spain alleging birth-related brain injury shows the claim arose in Spain (concurrence). | Majority: location is objective (where force impinged), not plaintiff knowledge; concurrence: administrative filing timing reinforces Spain as place of claim. |
| Whether derivative or later-manifesting injuries avoid § 2680(k) | Later-manifesting or derivative harms (diagnosable later) should allow suit in U.S. | Allowing that would let plaintiffs plead around the exception; derivative harms are barred if rooted in foreign injury. | Derivative or later-identifiable symptoms do not avoid the exception when initial harmful force occurred abroad. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (interprets § 2680(k) to bar claims based on injuries suffered in a foreign country and endorses lex loci delicti)
- Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (FTCA waives sovereign immunity subject to statutory exceptions)
- United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (statutory language controls scope of FTCA exclusions)
- United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (FTCA accrual inquiry tied to plaintiff’s injury/knowledge for statute of limitations)
- Gross v. United States, 771 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (foreign-country exception barred derivative economic injuries in U.S. when rooted in foreign harm)
- Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (foreign-country exception applies to domestic emotional harms derivative of foreign injuries)