909 F.3d 247
9th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Rocio Aurora Martinez-de Ryan, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without inspection and later paid DMV employee(s) cash to obtain identification for undocumented noncitizens.
- In 2010 she pleaded guilty to one count of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
- The government served a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime involving moral turpitude).
- Martinez conceded inadmissibility but applied for cancellation of removal; an IJ pretermitted the application, holding her bribery conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude.
- The BIA affirmed; Martinez petitioned for review arguing (A) her § 666(a)(2) bribery conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude and (B) the statutory phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague.
- The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, holding § 666(a)(2) bribery categorically involves moral turpitude and the statutory phrase is not unconstitutionally vague.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) is categorically a "crime involving moral turpitude" | Martinez: § 666(a)(2) does not categorically require moral turpitude (challenging categorical application). | Government: § 666(a)(2) has a corrupt-intent element ("corruptly") and thus involves moral turpitude. | Held: § 666(a)(2) requires a corrupt mind and categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. |
| Whether the statutory phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) is unconstitutionally vague | Martinez: Phrase is vague and violates due process. | Government: Phrase has longstanding judicial meaning; not unconstitutionally vague. | Held: Following Jordan v. De George and Tseung Chu, the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague; Dimaya does not compel overruling precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (Supreme Court held "crime of moral turpitude" not unconstitutionally vague)
- Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (Ninth Circuit followed Jordan and rejected vagueness challenge)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (Supreme Court applied void-for-vagueness doctrine to a different immigration-related residual clause)
- Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing tests for moral turpitude; requiring corrupt motive for certain analyses)
- United States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognized § 666's corrupt intent requirement)