Ryan v. ICE, 974 F.3d 9

ICE increased civil arrests of removable noncitizens at state courthouses and issued Directive 11072.1 in January 2018 formalizing courthouse-enforcement policy.
Directive broadened who could be arrested in courthouses (e.g., removed aliens, re‑entrants) and relaxed prior limits on arresting collateral persons; it nonetheless advised generally avoiding courthouse enforcement when possible.
Massachusetts officials and organizations (county DAs, the public defender agency, Chelsea Collaborative) sued under the APA, alleging the Directive exceeded ICE's authority because the INA incorporates a common‑law privilege against civil arrests of parties/witnesses attending court.
The district court preliminarily enjoined ICE from implementing the Directive or civilly arresting persons attending Massachusetts courthouses on official business.
On interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit held plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their primary (nonderogation) theory, found the Gregory/federalism (clear‑statement) argument underdeveloped on the record, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further factfinding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the INA implicitly incorporates a common‑law privilege protecting parties/witnesses from civil courthouse arrests (so ICE lacks authority to arrest such persons)	Ryan: The nonderogation canon presumes Congress kept a long‑established privilege against courthouse civil arrests when it authorized civil arrest powers in the INA.	ICE: INA's text (§§ 1226, 1357) plainly authorizes civil arrests; no clear historical rule limited civil arrests of sovereign‑initiated enforcement.	Held: Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed. The court found no clear, long‑established common‑law rule showing the privilege applied to sovereign civil arrests (immigration removals) in 1952; district court abused its discretion.
Whether the INA should be construed to avoid authorizing federal conduct that interferes with Massachusetts' sovereign operation of its courts absent a clear statement (Gregory/federalism canon)	Ryan: Massachusetts common law narrowly protects persons attending court; Congress did not clearly authorize federal arrests that would displace that state sovereignty.	ICE: Congress granted broad civil‑arrest authority; Massachusetts policies (Trial Court rules) and record evidence do not show a categorical state prohibition.	Held: The record is underdeveloped. The court could not conclude plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their clear‑statement federalism argument and remanded for factfinding.

Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (explains nonderogation canon and limits on reading common‑law rules into statutes)
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (federalism/clear‑statement canon before construing statutes to displace state sovereignty)
City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2020) (framework on agency authority under the INA and statutory construction)
New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (likelihood of success is dispositive in preliminary injunction analysis)
Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (history of civil process; shift from capias to summons)
Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916) (federal common‑law recognition of privilege protecting nonresident suitors/witnesses from service while attending court)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (characterizes removal as a unique civil sanction)
Thuraissigiam v. Department of Homeland Security, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (describes admission/exclusion of aliens as a sovereign prerogative)