Ryan Martin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 75A04-1609-CR-2098

Police searched a residence Martin was staying at and found meth residue, paraphernalia, Sudafed packaging, an active "one pot" meth lab, and items used to manufacture meth.
Martin was interviewed and made statements that he bought Sudafed for others, received money or meth from "cooks," and that he would not have consented to a search if he had known incriminating items were present.
Martin was charged with multiple drug offenses; after a jury trial he was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine (aiding/inducing) as a Level 5 felony; other convictions were not entered.
On cross-examination the prosecutor questioned Martin about being on probation and that a probation condition waived his Fourth Amendment right to refuse searches of his residence; defense counsel agreed to that limited line of questioning.
Martin appealed, arguing the admission of testimony that he was on probation and had waived Fourth Amendment rights was prejudicial under Evidence Rule 403 and amounted to improper impeachment or fundamental error.

Issue	State's Argument	Martin's Argument	Held
Whether the court abused its discretion by admitting testimony that Martin was on probation and had waived Fourth Amendment rights (probation search condition)	Martin opened the door by testifying he wouldn’t have consented if he’d known about the drugs; the evidence was admissible to show his consent wasn’t necessary and harmless if erroneous	Admission was unfairly prejudicial, suggested prior conviction/bad character, and violated Evid. R. 403; objection preserved or alternatively fundamental error	Waived (defense counsel accepted limited inquiry). Even if questioned, admission was permissible to rebut a misleading impression about consent, not fundamental error, and any error was harmless given overwhelming independent evidence of guilt

Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind. 1997) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1997) (abuse of discretion standard for admission decisions)
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. 2011) (harmless-error analysis for evidentiary rulings)
Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111 (Ind. 2015) (procedural default from failure to timely object; fundamental-error exception)
Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 2009) (framework for admitting other-acts evidence under Evid. R. 404(b))
Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 2000) (scope of "opening the door" to otherwise inadmissible evidence)
Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2006) (narrow scope of fundamental-error doctrine)
Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010) (fundamental error available only in egregious circumstances)
Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663 (Ind. 2014) (fundamental error not a remedy for preserved trial-strategy failures)
Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 1997) (purpose of Evid. R. 404(b) to prevent propensity-based convictions)