Ryan D. Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc.
861 F.3d 1338
11th Cir.2017Background
- Burch sued his former employer, P.J. Cheese, in federal court (Aug. 2009) alleging pay- and race-based employment claims and demanded a jury trial.
- P.J. Cheese moved to compel arbitration under the parties’ written employment arbitration agreement; Burch denied he signed the agreement.
- The district court found a genuine factual dispute over the signature and ordered a trial to resolve arbitrability; parties proceeded with merits discovery and litigation for years.
- Burch’s only jury demand was a general demand in his complaint; he did not specifically demand a jury for the signature/arbitrability issue by the deadline set for opposing the motion to compel (the §4 “return day”).
- After extensive proceedings, the district court held a bench trial on the signature issue, found the signature authentic, granted the motion to compel arbitration, and dismissed the case without prejudice.
- On appeal Burch argued the court erred by (1) trying arbitrability to the bench despite his jury demand, (2) allowing P.J. Cheese to litigate without waiving arbitration, and (3) waiting years to try arbitrability; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a general jury demand preserved Burch’s §4 FAA right to a jury on arbitrability | Burch: Rule 38’s general jury demand preserved his §4 statutory jury right | P.J. Cheese: §4 provides its own, specific demand procedure that displaces Rule 38; Burch didn’t comply | Held: §4’s specific timing and specificity requirements displace Rule 38; Burch waived the §4 jury right by not timely specifically demanding a jury on arbitrability |
| Whether Burch timely and properly demanded a jury under §4 | Burch: his complaint’s jury demand sufficed | P.J. Cheese: §4 requires a specific demand “on or before the return day” addressing “such issue” | Held: General demand insufficient; §4 requires a specific, timely demand and Burch failed to make one |
| Whether P.J. Cheese waived arbitration by litigating the merits after initial denial | Burch: participation in merits indicates waiver, causing prejudice | P.J. Cheese: acted only as ordered; participation after court’s direction isn’t inconsistent with arbitration | Held: No waiver—defendant’s orderly participation after court order did not show intent inconsistent with arbitration; prejudice not reached |
| Whether the district court abused authority by not proceeding promptly to a §4 summary trial earlier in the 45‑month interval | Burch: district court should have proceeded summarily sooner; delay forfeited power to compel arbitration | P.J. Cheese: no controlling law prescribing a bright-line time; Burch never sought earlier resolution | Held: Issue forfeited (not raised below); even on plain‑error standard, no miscarriage of justice shown; court did not err |
Key Cases Cited
- Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003) (context on arbitration-related litigation)
- Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (U.S. 2006) (FAA’s purpose to overcome judicial resistance to arbitration)
- Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (federal policy favoring arbitration; resolve doubts in favor of arbitration)
- Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (U.S. 1987) (§4 authorizes district court to compel arbitration)
- First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (U.S. 1995) (threshold of whether arbitration agreement exists is a contract question)
- Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2016) (standard for resolving factual disputes over arbitration agreement formation)