Rutz v. Commissioner of Social Security
1:16-cv-03207
E.D. Wash.Nov 6, 2017Background
- John Rutz applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability from April 9, 2013 (amended), due to congenital myopathy, foot deformities, obesity, depression/bipolar disorder, anxiety/social phobia/PTSD, ADHD and related symptoms; ALJ denied benefits on June 9, 2015 and Appeals Council denied review.
- At hearing Rutz testified to daily panic attacks (3–4/week), social anxiety preventing work, limited lifting (≈20 lbs), difficulty with fine motor tasks and standing more than ~30 minutes; he was nonetheless attending community college (15 credits, mostly online).
- ALJ found severe impairments but determined Rutz had RFC for light work with multiple nonexertional limitations (limited public/coworker interaction, simple routine tasks, occasional postural limits) and could perform jobs existing in the national economy.
- ALJ gave significant weight to nonexamining state agency opinions and little weight to treating/examining opinions of Dr. Caryn Jackson (treating PCP) and Dr. Philip Barnard (examining psychologist).
- ALJ discounted Rutz’s symptom testimony and his mother’s lay statements in part because they were inconsistent with medical records, mental status exams, and Rutz’s daily activities (noting college attendance).
- District court granted plaintiff’s motion in part, denied defendant’s, and remanded for further development because the ALJ improperly rejected treating/examining opinions relying primarily on nonexamining reviewers and failed to adequately identify specific inconsistencies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weight given to treating/examining medical opinions | ALJ improperly rejected Drs. Jackson and Barnard without specific, legitimate reasons; relied improperly on nonexamining reviewers | ALJ permissibly relied on state agency assessments and treatment record inconsistencies | Court: ALJ erred — nonexamining opinions cannot by themselves justify rejecting treating/examining opinions; ALJ failed to identify specific contradictory longitudinal or exam evidence; remand to reassess RFC and develop record |
| Credibility of plaintiff's symptom testimony | ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons identifying which statements were not credible and why | ALJ cited lack of objective support, improvement with treatment, and daily activities as bases for discounting testimony | Court: Because medical-opinion error undermines RFC, ALJ must on remand reassess testimony and state what is not credible and why (remand for further proceedings) |
| Lay witness statements (mother) | ALJ improperly discounted mother’s statements without germane reasons | ALJ rejected lay statements for same reasons as claimant’s testimony (record inconsistency) | Court: Rejection tied to claimant credibility; on remand ALJ must reevaluate lay statements after reassessing medical evidence and testimony |
| Remedy | Plaintiff sought immediate award of benefits | Commissioner sought affirmance | Court: Record not fully developed; remand for further administrative proceedings (consultative exams or medical expert testimony, new RFC, and vocational testimony if needed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1996) (treating/examining opinions generally entitled to greater weight than nonexamining opinions)
- Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989) (nonexamining opinions may supplement but cannot alone justify rejecting treating/examining opinions; ALJ must point to other evidence)
- Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015) (agency must articulate reasons for its conclusions with sufficient specificity for meaningful review)
- Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ responsible for credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony)
- Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996) (absent malingering, ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons to reject claimant testimony; court may remand for development or award benefits)
- Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1998) (medical evidence of impairment does not permit discrediting claimant’s symptom testimony without specific reasons)