Rutledge v. City of Kimball
304 Neb. 593
| Neb. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff Amie Rutledge alleges she was attacked and choked by David Ford, an employee of the City of Kimball, in the Kimball City Building.
- Rutledge filed an administrative claim with the City and a lawsuit against Ford; she later amended to add the City, alleging negligence for failing to supervise, hire, and protect the public given Ford’s alleged violent history.
- The City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the claim is barred by the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) intentional torts exception.
- The district court granted the City’s motion, concluding the claim arose out of an assault/battery and was therefore exempt from the PSTCA waiver of immunity.
- Rutledge dismissed her claim against Ford with prejudice; she appealed the dismissal of the City. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed de novo and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rutledge’s negligence claim against the City is barred by the PSTCA intentional torts exception (§13-910(7)) | Rutledge: claim rests on City’s independent duty to protect the public, not on Ford’s employment; employment status immaterial | City: claim "arises out of" Ford’s assault/battery; reframing as negligence cannot avoid the exemption | Held: barred — claim arises out of a battery and falls within the intentional torts exception |
| Whether allegations amount to negligent supervision/hiring (and so are barred) | Rutledge: not pursuing vicarious liability or negligent hiring/supervision; alleges an independent duty to protect | City: even negligent supervision/selection claims that stem from employment are barred under Johnson/Sheridan | Held: claims tied to the employment relationship or supervision/selection are barred |
| Whether Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. permits an independent-duty negligence claim here (premises/protection theory) | Rutledge: relies on Doe to argue a separate duty to protect the public on municipal premises | City: Doe is distinguishable because Ford was an employee; Rutledge did not plead an independent duty unrelated to employment | Held: Doe is distinguishable; no special relationship or independent duty pleaded, so immunity applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. 316, 700 N.W.2d 620 (2005) (claims based on employment relationship, including negligent supervision/hiring, fall within intentional-torts exception)
- Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988) (framework for determining whether claim "arises out of" assault/battery; Kennedy concurrence emphasized distinguishing independent duties from supervision/selection duties)
- Britton v. City of Crawford, 282 Neb. 374, 803 N.W.2d 508 (2011) (negligence claim "inextricably linked" to battery falls within the intentional torts exception)
- Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79, 727 N.W.2d 447 (2007) (permitted negligence claim where breach of an independent legal duty by the school, not based on an employment relationship, was alleged)
- Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 302 Neb. 442, 923 N.W.2d 717 (2019) (PSTCA governs claims based on acts or omissions of employees within scope of employment)