184 A.3d 345
D.C.2018Background
- Saunders contracted to buy a four‑unit building from Hudgens; Hudgens instead sold it to Arnold. Saunders sued Hudgens (breach / specific performance) and Arnold (tortious interference), seeking both specific performance and damages. The two cases were consolidated with TOPA tenant claims.
- Court bifurcated proceedings: a jury trial on the tortious‑interference damages claim against Arnold, then a bench trial on equitable claims (including specific performance against Hudgens).
- The jury found Arnold liable for conspiring to cause Hudgens’s breach, awarded Saunders $40,000 in contract‑type damages, and the judge deferred entry of judgment pending the bench phase.
- In the bench phase Saunders sought a decree of specific performance against Hudgens; the trial judge denied specific performance on the ground Saunders had elected damages and could not obtain a double recovery, and entered judgment for $40,000 against Arnold.
- On appeal the court held Saunders was not required to elect remedies before adjudication; she could pursue both remedies to verdict but cannot receive more than one satisfaction for the same wrong. The case was vacated and remanded for the trial court to determine Saunders’s entitlement to specific performance and then permit her to elect a remedy before final judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Saunders was precluded from seeking specific performance because she had "elected" damages by litigating against Arnold | Saunders argued she made no pretrial election and may pursue specific performance from Hudgens even though she sought damages from Arnold | Trial judge and Arnold argued the jury award of damages meant Saunders had elected damages and could not also get specific performance (to avoid double recovery) | Court held Saunders was not required to elect remedies before adjudication; she could pursue both and must choose one remedy before enforcement to avoid double recovery |
| Whether a plaintiff may obtain both damages from a tortious‑interferer and specific performance from the breaching seller | Saunders contended she could obtain remedies from different defendants on different theories | Arnold/trial court contended awarding both would permit double recovery for the same harm | Court held a plaintiff cannot receive cumulative satisfaction for the same harm: damages equivalent to specific performance and specific performance are duplicative; only one satisfaction permitted |
| Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying specific performance based solely on the damages verdict | Saunders argued denial was error because she had not elected and entitlement to specific performance was not yet adjudicated | Trial court relied on election/double‑recovery doctrine to deny specific performance as a legal matter | Court reviewed de novo and found error: judge should have adjudicated entitlement to specific performance and then allowed Saunders to elect remedy before final judgment |
| Whether Saunders already received "one satisfaction" from Arnold’s unpaid judgment so as to bar further relief | Saunders asserted Arnold has not paid, so no satisfaction occurred | If Saunders had accepted payment, she would be barred from further recovery | Court noted record shows Arnold has not paid; if payment had been accepted, the one‑satisfaction rule would bar additional relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256 (D.C. 1984) (duplicative remedies barred to prevent double recovery)
- Giordano v. Interdonato, 586 A.2d 714 (D.C. 1991) (plaintiff need not elect remedies before jury; may pursue alternatives to verdict and elect at judgment)
- Independence Mgmt. Co. v. Anderson & Summers, LLC, 874 A.2d 862 (D.C. 2005) (standard of appellate review for denial of specific performance)
- Campbell‑Crane & Assocs. v. Stamenkovic, 44 A.3d 924 (D.C. 2012) (presumption that jury followed court instructions regarding damages)
- Tauber v. Quan, 938 A.2d 724 (D.C. 2007) (specific performance routinely available for real estate contracts)
- Allen v. Yates, 870 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2005) (party entitled to be made whole—benefit of the bargain concept)