RUTH FARLOW V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 53 F.4th 485

Farlow suffered a myocardial infarction in July 2013; initial ejection fraction (EF) was ~50% but a 2015 stress test showed normal heart function and EF of 77%.
She applied for Social Security Title II disability benefits in February 2017, claiming post‑MI chest pain, shortness of breath, and limited stamina.
State agency non‑examining physician Dr. Norman Staley reviewed records and opined Farlow was limited to light work (stand/walk 6 hours; lift ≤20 lbs).
The ALJ rejected Dr. Staley’s opinion, credited other evidence, and found Farlow capable of medium work with restrictions, denying benefits at step four (could perform past relevant work).
The Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed the ALJ. The Commissioner concedes Staley’s opinion—if credited—would limit Farlow to light work.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the ALJ permissibly discounted the non‑examining opinion and properly rejected claimant’s symptom testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the uncontested non‑examining physician opinion	Farlow: ALJ needed "clear and convincing" reasons to reject the only functional assessment and improperly substituted a lay judgment for medical opinion	Commissioner/ALJ: Different, lower standard applies to non‑examining opinions; ALJ may reject by citing specific contradictory record evidence	Held: ALJ did not err; Sousa standard applies—ALJ may reject non‑examining opinion by reference to specific medical evidence, and ALJ gave permissible reasons (relied on 2013 EF and ignored 2015 normal EF; non‑examining, not persuasive, inconsistent with record)
Whether the ALJ properly discounted Farlow’s (and her husband’s) symptom testimony	Farlow: testimony of limiting symptoms should be credited	Commissioner/ALJ: Testimony inconsistent with objective medical record and daily activities; ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons to discount	Held: ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to reject claimant’s testimony; any error as to husband’s similar statement was harmless

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review and substantial‑evidence/legal‑error framework)
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (definition of substantial evidence)
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (classic formulation of substantial evidence)
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (review defers to reasonable ALJ interpretations)
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (weighting of treating/examining opinions; "clear and convincing" rule for rejecting treating/examining opinions)
Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1998) (ALJ may reject non‑examining physician by referencing specific medical record evidence)
Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785 (9th Cir. 2022) (discussing regulatory changes to medical‑opinion evaluation and their effect)
Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (standards for discounting claimant symptom testimony)
Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843 (9th Cir. 2022) (related tenure/constitutional discussion referenced by claimant)