297 F. Supp. 3d 639
N.D. Tex.2017Background
- Edward Lynn Russell was civilly committed in Texas (2008) as a sexually violent predator and placed on outpatient treatment and supervision under Chapter 841.
- His commitment order required residence in supervised housing, GPS monitoring, and compliance with a "specific course of treatment" and written requirements of the Council/Office.
- Russell signed multiple documents agreeing to program rules; he was later indicted on eleven felony counts for violating commitment requirements (e.g., failing to keep a thought journal, not completing assignments, sexual conduct, tampering with GPS, failing medication).
- A jury convicted Russell on all counts and sentenced him to concurrent 20-year terms; state habeas relief was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals without written order.
- The Fifth Circuit remanded for consideration whether former Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.085 and 841.082(a)(4) are unconstitutionally vague under Supreme Court precedents (Hill, Grayned, Kolender).
- The district court held that the phrase "specific course of treatment" in § 841.082(a)(4) is impermissibly vague and that § 841.085 criminalizing violations of such requirements is void for vagueness; convictions based on that provision were vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 841.082(a)(4) "participation in and compliance with a specific course of treatment" gives fair notice and prevents arbitrary enforcement | Russell: language is vague and grants private actors unfettered discretion to set rules that become criminal; lacks written standards or safeguards | State: provision reasonably allows treatment requirements tied to supervision and protects the community; treated as valid exercise of statutory scheme | Held: § 841.082(a)(4) is unconstitutionally vague because "specific course of treatment" fails to give ordinary people fair notice and invites arbitrary enforcement |
| Whether § 841.085 (criminalizing violation of civil-commitment requirements) is void-for-vagueness as applied to § 841.082(a)(4) violations | Russell: criminalization of unspecified treatment requirements compounds vagueness and penalizes conduct lacking clear notice | State: criminal enforcement of commitment requirements is permissible to ensure compliance and protect public safety | Held: § 841.085 (as applied to § 841.082(a)(4)) is void for vagueness; convictions under these provisions vacated |
| Whether the state court decision denying relief was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA | Russell: state decision conflicted with Hill, Grayned, Kolender and thus was unreasonable | State: denial was proper and within state courts' discretion; AEDPA deference applies | Held: District court found state adjudication contrary to or an unreasonable application of Hill/Grayned/Kolender and granted habeas relief as to these counts |
| Whether certificate of appealability should issue for denied claims | Russell: seeks COA on vagueness and other claims | State: COA standard not met for denied claims | Held: COA denied for parts of petition still rejected; petitioner did not make substantial showing of denial of constitutional right |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (statute impermissibly vague if it fails to give ordinary people reasonable opportunity to know prohibited conduct or invites arbitrary enforcement)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (laws must give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice and provide explicit standards for those who apply them)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (void-for-vagueness requires penal statute define offense with sufficient definiteness to avoid arbitrary enforcement)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (government violates due process when a criminal law is too vague to give fair notice or invites arbitrary enforcement)