Russell Real Property Services, LLC v. State Ex Rel. Hosemann, 200 So. 3d 426

Background

In 2010 the State and City of Pass Christian executed a 40-year lease to use a portion of the Harrison County shoreline for harbor and development purposes.
Russell Real Property Services, LLC (Russell RP) sued in 2013 for inverse condemnation, claiming a one-half interest in land between U.S. 90 and the Gulf shoreline that was allegedly taken by the lease.
Russell RP’s title rests on a chain of quitclaim deeds (incorporating a 1984 deed) culminating in a November 22, 2010 quitclaim from the Ellis Trust to Russell RP.
The alleged taking occurred on September 24, 2010 (date of the lease); at that time Russell RP had not yet received the quitclaim from the Ellis Trust.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the State and City, holding Russell RP lacked standing to pursue inverse condemnation; Russell RP appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to bring inverse condemnation	Russell RP claims an ownership interest (one-half) and thus standing to assert a taking from the 9/24/2010 lease	Russell RP did not own the property on 9/24/2010; Ellis Trust held the interest then, so Russell RP lacked standing	Court held Russell RP lacked standing because it did not hold present, actionable title when the alleged taking occurred
Whether post-taking conveyance transferred cause of action	Russell RP contends the November 22, 2010 quitclaim (or ongoing taking) gives it the claim	State argues quitclaim did not assign any preexisting cause of action and deeds do not implicitly convey prior causes of action	Court found no evidence the Ellis Trust assigned the claim; prior trespass doctrine applies — deed does not implicitly transfer prior claims
Claim that taking was "ongoing" or recurred on conveyance	Russell RP argued (without authority) the taking continued or reoccurred when it acquired the interest	State maintained the taking (if any) was the lease execution on 9/24/2010 and not revived by later conveyance	Court rejected unsupported "ongoing taking" argument as waived for lack of authority and not applicable
Use of littoral/riparian rights to establish standing	Russell RP asserted its chain of deeds conferred riparian/littoral rights that support standing	State countered littoral/riparian rights are revocable licenses, not property rights, so they cannot create standing for inverse condemnation	Court held littoral/riparian rights are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests for standing purposes

Key Cases Cited

Young v. Smith, 67 So. 3d 732 (Miss. 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Hosemann v. Harris, 163 So. 3d 263 (Miss. 2015) (summary judgment standards)
State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 2001) (Mississippi's standing standards)
Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 2007) (requirement of present, existent actionable title at time suit filed)
City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162 (Miss. 2000) (standing/jurisdictional principles)
Flowers v. McCraw, 792 So. 2d 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (deeds do not implicitly convey claims for prior trespass)
Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So. 2d 161 (Miss. 1999) (prior-trespass/deed-transfer principles)
Catchot v. Zeigler, 45 So. 707 (Miss. 1908) (riparian/littoral rights characterized as licenses, not property)
Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367 (Miss. 1992) (riparian/littoral rights are revocable and not property per se)
Watts v. Lawrence, 703 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1997) (statutory scope of littoral rights and related interpretation)
McNeil v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 2000) (issues unsupported by authority deemed abandoned)

Conclusion: The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed summary judgment for the State and City, holding Russell RP lacked standing to pursue inverse condemnation because it did not hold actionable title at the time of the alleged taking, no assignment of the claim was shown, and littoral rights are revocable privileges rather than compensable property interests.