Russell Johnson, Iii v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000

Johnson, African American, employed by Lucent predecessor AT&T Bell Labs; took mental disability leave in 1986 and was terminated in 1987.
In 1989, Johnson sued for long-term disability benefits; court ordered ongoing treatment and periodic proof of treatment; Lucent retained right to terminate benefits for noncompliance.
In 1990, district court again ordered retroactive disability benefits and treatment proof; Lucent later allegedly failed to comply with those orders.
In 2005, Johnson sued in state court for assault, battery, IIED, and FEHA-related claims; removed to federal court and dismissed as time-barred, with Johnson denied leave to amend.
In 2006–2008, Lucent sought to terminate disability benefits in Pennsylvania; Johnson submitted some medical documentation but did not fully comply; Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of some prior claims.
In August 2008, Johnson filed a federal complaint in California alleging Section 1981 retaliation, Title VII, IIED; district court dismissed some claims as time-barred and noted statute of limitations issues; Johnson appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1981 retaliation claims are governed by §1658 four-year period.	Johnson argues §1658 applies since post-1990 enactment.	Lucent argues §1658 does not apply due to Patterson-era interpretation and pre-1990 §1981.	§1658 four-year period applies; claim timely.
Whether Johnson's IIED claim is time-barred under California choice-of-law rules.	Johnson contends earlier accrual and time-bar.	Lucent contends accrual at petition to terminate (June 13, 2006).	Under CA law, accrual when harm is inflicted; not time-barred as accrual occurred after 2006–2007.
Whether Johnson’s EEOC charge was timely under Title VII and tolling principles.	Equitable tolling and pendency of appeal should toll the 180-day period; alleged mental incompetence.	No tolling for appeal, and no mental-incompetence tolling.	Equitable tolling rejected; pursuit of appeal did not toll; no mental-incompetence tolling; Title VII timely issues not established.
Whether Johnson states a plausible fraudulent concealment or abuse-of-process claim.	Claims supported by alleged misrepresentations regarding Dr. Shamie’s form.	Johnson’s own submission and lack of timely action defeat these claims.	District court correctly dismissed these claims; leave to amend would be futile.

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (determined when a claim arises under amended §1981 for purposes of §1658)
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (held that §1981 did not cover post-contract formation retaliation before amendment)
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. No. 102-166), - (1991) (amended §1981 to include retaliation and broader contract rights; triggers §1658 applicability)
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (see above)
Ricks v. Delaware State College, 449 U.S. 250 (1981) (tolling analysis for Title VII claims and grievance procedures)
Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2008) (abuse of estoppel review standard in Title VII context)
Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990) (leave to amend futility)
Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (mental incompetence tolling standard)
Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (mental incompetence tolling)
Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 19 P.3d 1076 (Cal. 2001) (choice-of-law considerations in CA)
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (Title VII tolling principles)