888 F.3d 971
8th Cir.2018Background
- Appellants sued under the Price-Anderson Act alleging decedents were exposed to radioactive materials handled by defendants decades earlier; the decedents died more than three years before suit was filed.
- Price-Anderson’s public-liability amendment creates a federal cause of action but directs that substantive rules be derived from the law of the state where the incident occurred unless inconsistent with the Act.
- The Act contains a special accrual/discovery scheme for “extraordinary nuclear occurrences” (ENOs) but otherwise incorporates state limitation and accrual rules for ordinary incidents.
- Defendants moved to dismiss wrongful-death claims as time-barred under Missouri’s wrongful-death statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100 (three-year limit measured from death).
- The district court initially denied dismissal but, after Missouri Supreme Court decisions (Boland and Beisly), reconsidered and granted dismissal, holding Missouri law controls and disallows a discovery rule; CERCLA accrual provisions were found inapplicable.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, concluded Missouri’s rule governs, and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri’s wrongful-death statute permits a discovery rule or tolling for latent contamination claims | Appellants: statute should yield to a discovery rule because injuries from toxic exposure are latent and could not reasonably be discovered before death | Defendants: § 537.100 is unambiguous; claims accrue at death and no discovery rule or tolling applies | Held: Missouri Supreme Court precedent (Boland, Beisly) bars a discovery rule; claims accrued at death and are untimely |
| Whether equitable estoppel/fraudulent concealment can bar statute-of-limitations defense under Missouri law | Appellants: secrecy and concealment by defendants should allow tolling or equitable relief | Defendants: no allegations of fraudulent concealment; equitable estoppel unavailable | Held: Beisly permits equitable estoppel only for fraudulent concealment, but appellants never asserted that theory below, so it was waived |
| Whether CERCLA’s federally required commencement date (discovery rule) displaces Missouri’s accrual rule | Appellants: CERCLA § 9658 supplies a discovery-based commencement date for toxic-exposure claims and preempts an earlier state start date | Defendants: CERCLA accrual applies only to actions brought under state law; Price-Anderson claims are federal public-liability actions that incorporate state substantive law but arise under federal law | Held: Price-Anderson actions are federal actions arising under the Act; CERCLA’s state-law accrual rule does not apply |
| Characterization of Price-Anderson public-liability claims: federal or state law for accrual and jurisdiction | Appellants: (implicit) treat claims as state-law for accrual purposes | Defendants: Act creates a federal cause of action that incorporates state substantive law but is federal for jurisdiction and procedural framing | Held: The Act creates a federal cause of action (“arising under” federal law) that incorporates state substantive rules; federal characterization controls accrual analysis here |
Key Cases Cited
- Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. banc 2015) (Missouri Supreme Court holds § 537.100 accrues at death and rejects a discovery rule and fraudulent-concealment tolling)
- Missouri ex rel. Beisly II v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434 (Mo. banc 2015) (Missouri Supreme Court agrees accrual is at death but allows equitable estoppel against limitations defense where defendant fraudulently concealed wrongdoing)
- O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing Price-Anderson’s purpose and incorporation of state substantive rules)
- Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that non-ENO Price-Anderson claims generally incorporate state statutes of limitations unless inconsistent with § 2210)
- In re TMI Litig. Consol. II, 89 F.3d 1106 (3d Cir. 1996) (treating Price-Anderson Amendments as creating substantive federal law governing public-liability actions)