Rural Bldg. of Cincinnati L.L.C. v. Mercer
2017 Ohio 7226
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- RBOC owned a building in Evendale and bid successfully for an ICE lease; an unsuccessful bidder (Hausman) misrepresented himself to the Village building official, Mercer, and submitted zoning forms describing the use as a “detention facility.”
- Mercer (Chief Building Official, an appointed position) denied the initial and subsequent zoning compliance requests, citing the Village zoning code’s prohibition on a “Detention Facility.”
- After learning of Hausman’s misrepresentations, Mercer spoke with federal officials who described the ICE use as primarily office space with four temporary holding rooms; Mercer nonetheless issued a denial letter. Cameron (assistant to the mayor) attended a community meeting and communicated with residents about the proposal.
- RBOC appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA); the BZA denied RBOC’s appeal and RBOC lost the ICE contract opportunity.
- RBOC sued Mercer and Cameron (claims narrowed on appeal to: intentional interference with a constitutional right against both; intentional interference with a contract and negligence against Mercer). Mercer and Cameron moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act (R.C. Chapter 2744); the trial court denied immunity and they appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mercer is an “employee” under R.C. 2744.01(B) or an independent contractor | RBOC argued Mercer could be treated as an independent contractor, precluding immunity | Mercer argued he is an appointed official (thus an "employee") and entitled to immunity | Mercer is an appointed official and thus an employee as a matter of law under R.C. 2744.01(B) |
| Whether the suit is against defendants in official or individual capacities for immunity purposes | RBOC proceeded against individuals (and labeled Mercer an independent contractor for one claim) | Mercer/Cameron assumed to be sued in individual capacities but argued employee immunity still applies | Court assumed individual-capacity pleadings for purposes of appeal but applied employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) |
| Whether Mercer and Cameron acted with malicious purpose, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) | RBOC claimed Mercer knowingly spread false information and Cameron orchestrated public outrage, rising to recklessness/malice | Defendants argued their conduct was within official duties and undertaken in good faith based on available information | No evidence of malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness; both entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) |
| Whether RBOC’s negligence and intentional-interference claims survive against a protected employee | RBOC contended its claims stated actionable misconduct outside immunity exceptions | Defendants argued negligence and ordinary zoning decisions do not meet the higher standard in 2744.03(A)(6)(b) | Negligence claim fails (insufficient for (b)); intentional-interference claims fail because record lacks requisite malice/bad faith/recklessness |
Key Cases Cited
- Hubbell v. City of Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 (Ohio 2007) (order denying immunity is final appealable order)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (summary-judgment standard)
- Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144 (Ohio 1988) (right-to-control test for employee vs. independent contractor analysis)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 2012) (definitions of wanton and reckless conduct under R.C. 2744.03)
- O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (Ohio 2008) (recklessness requires more than negligence)
- Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349 (Ohio 2016) (employee-immunity analysis under R.C. 2744.03 is separate from merits)
- Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231 (Ohio 2010) (official- vs. individual-capacity pleading controls scope of immunity analysis)
- Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83 (Ohio 2009) (appealability of orders denying immunity even without Civ.R. 54(B) certification)
Decision: Reversed trial court; summary judgment granted to Mercer and Cameron (entitled to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) immunity).