Runningeagle v. Schriro
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14682
9th Cir.2012Background
- Runningeagle and Tilden were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the Williamses’ deaths; Runningeagle received the death penalty, Tilden received life sentences.
- The murders occurred after the defendants burglarized the Williamses’ home in December 1987; physical evidence linked Runningeagle to the crime scene and stolen property.
- Melendez, a jailhouse informant in a related case, spoke with prosecutors about the murders, but prosecutors did not disclose Melendez’s statements to Runningeagle’s defense.
- Runningeagle pursued multiple state and federal post-conviction remedies; the district court later denied his habeas petition, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo under AEDPA.
- The central Brady issue is whether the state courts properly adjudicated the claim that Brady material (Melendez’s statements) was suppressed and whether discovery was warranted for sentencing-phase material.
- Judge Pregerson filed a partial concurrence and partial dissent urging discovery and examining the Brady materiality standard and related discovery issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady materiality standard applied | Runningeagle | Runningeagle | State court used wrong Brady standard; error under 2254(d)(1) |
| Discovery on sentencing-phase Brady claim | Runningeagle | State | De novo review allows limited discovery for sentencing-phase Brady claim |
| Mutually antagonistic defenses and severance | Runningeagle | Tilden | Arizona Supreme Court did not err; severance not required; no deficient performance |
| Prosecutorial misconduct during opening/closing | Runningeagle | State | Improper but not due process violation given evidence and court cautions |
| Individualized sentencing in a joint sentencing | Runningeagle | State | Joint sentencing did not violate Eighth Amendment; individualized considerations present |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bagley, 473 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 2009) (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999) (materiality/prejudice in Brady context; impeachment evidence)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (U.S. 1974) (prosecutorial remarks; not per se reversible error when evidence strong)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1986) (prosecutorial misconduct; context-specific due process analysis)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (death-penalty sentencing scheme unconstitutional as applied to judges fact-finding)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (U.S. 1993) (mutually antagonistic defenses not automatically requiring severance)
- Lane v. United States, 474 U.S. 438 (U.S. 1986) (misjoinder not per se constitutional; prejudice standard for severance)
- Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (state court use of 'probably change the result' standard for materiality is contrary to Bagley)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits on evidentiary development under §2254(d)(1); discovery implications)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (deference framework for summary denials; when de novo review applies)
- Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (Brady materiality lower standard without requiring probable acquittal)