Ruiz v. Musclewood Inv. Props., LLC
28 Cal. App. 5th 15
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Oscar Ruiz, a legally blind man who uses a guide dog (Carbon), alleged defendants Edward Lopez and Musclewood Investment Properties, LLC maintained a loose guard dog that repeatedly attacked or threatened his guide dog while Ruiz walked on the public sidewalk adjacent to defendants' property.
- Attacks or threatening incidents occurred on six occasions between 2013 and 2015; Ruiz complained to defendants and animal control but the dog remained uncontrolled and the gate was left open.
- Ruiz stopped walking that portion of the sidewalk because his guide dog became fearful, aggressive, and unable to reliably perform guide duties.
- Ruiz sued under the Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (Civ. Code §§ 54, 54.1, 54.3), and for negligence; defendants demurred to the DPA cause of action and moved to strike remedies.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer as to the DPA cause of action without leave to amend and granted the motion to strike; Ruiz appealed.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the demurrer ruling and the order granting the motion to strike, remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a claim under Civ. Code § 54.3 for interference with admittance to or enjoyment of public facilities | Ruiz alleged his guide dog’s functioning was prevented by repeated attacks, causing loss of use/enjoyment of the sidewalk; alleged facts sufficed to show interference | Dem defendants argued Ruiz failed to allege denial of "equal access" and relied on earlier pleading that dogs attacked others too; also argued section 54.1 requirements apply | Held: § 54.3 claim stated. Section 54.3 does not require pleading unequal access (unlike § 54.1); allegations of attacks and resulting loss of sidewalk use suffice to plead interference |
| Whether intent is required under § 54.3 and whether it was alleged | Ruiz argued intent is not required or can be inferred from repeated attacks and defendants’ knowledge | Defendants implied intent element or insisted on showing discriminatory conduct | Held: Court need not decide whether intent is required generally; here repeated attacks plus defendants’ knowledge permit a reasonable inference of intent |
| Whether Ruiz had standing to recover damages under § 54.3 despite not seeking defendants’ services | Ruiz argued Reycraft does not bar damages when plaintiff presented himself at a public place (sidewalk) and was actually interfered with on particular occasions | Defendants relied on Reycraft and Urhausen to argue standing requires presenting to a business to use its services | Held: Ruiz has standing. Reycraft’s standing language requires showing one presented oneself at a public place to use it in its typical manner and was actually denied/interfered with on a particular occasion; walking on a public sidewalk met that test |
| Whether the trial court properly struck damages, treble damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief | Ruiz contended remedies under § 54.3 were available (actual damages, treble damages, attorney fees), but injunctive relief is not authorized under § 54.3 | Defendants moved to strike remedy prayers as unavailable if DPA claim failed | Held: Because the DPA cause of action under § 54.3 was adequately pleaded, striking damages, treble damages, and attorney fees was reversible error; injunctive relief under § 54.3 is not available and Ruiz did not contest that ruling on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112 (standards for demurrer review)
- Evans v. City of Berkeley, 38 Cal.4th 1 (pleaded facts accepted as true on demurrer)
- Reycraft v. Lee, 177 Cal.App.4th 1211 (discussion of standing under § 54.3 and requirement to show actual denial/interference on a particular occasion)
- Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 155 Cal.App.4th 254 (standing/§ 54.1 discussion)
- Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal.App.4th 174 (canon against judicially inserting requirements into statute)
