61 Cal.App.5th 385
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Nunez bought a used 2011 Jeep Patriot on Oct. 30, 2013; FCA (Chrysler) manufactured the vehicle and had issued a 3-year/36,000-mile express warranty that expired Dec. 31, 2013 absent tolling.
- The vehicle experienced a limp‑in mode/throttle problem; dealer replaced the throttle body for the first owner on Sept. 25, 2013 (in‑warranty), which resolved the issue for ~33 months.
- Plaintiff experienced recurrences in June, Oct., and March 2016–2017; dealer replaced the throttle body and later the throttle‑body connector; plaintiff requested a buyback in Oct. 2016 and sued in Dec. 2016 under the Song‑Beverly (lemon law).
- At trial the court gave CACI No. 3231 (correctly describing statutory tolling) and, over FCA’s objection, a plaintiff‑requested special instruction: “If a defect exists within the warranty period, the warranty will not expire until the defect has been fixed.”
- Jury returned unanimous verdicts for plaintiff (damages and willful‑violation penalties); court entered judgment and awarded attorney fees.
- On appeal the court reversed the judgment and fee award due to prejudicial instructional error, affirmed the nonsuit as to breach of implied warranty, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the special jury instruction that “If a defect exists within the warranty period, the warranty will not expire until the defect has been fixed” correctly states the law on warranty tolling | The quoted sentence (drawn from required repair‑invoice language) means any defect that exists during the warranty period keeps the warranty alive until the defect is diagnosed/fixed | The sentence, when given alone, misstates the Song‑Beverly tolling rules (Civ. Code §1795.6); CACI No. 3231 correctly limits tolling to statutory circumstances | The special instruction was legally incorrect and prejudicial; reversal and remand required — CACI No. 3231 is the proper instruction |
| Whether manufacturer (FCA) can be liable for breach of implied warranty in a used‑car sale absent evidence it acted as distributor or retailer | Nunez urged FCA should be liable (arguing FCA was distributor or that manufacturer liability applies similarly) | FCA argued Song‑Beverly limits implied‑warranty liability for used goods to distributors/retail sellers (not manufacturers), unless the manufacturer sold directly to the public | Affirmed nonsuit: implied‑warranty claim fails as a matter of law because FCA was the manufacturer, not shown to be a distributor/retailer (Kiluk principle) |
| Whether attorney‑fee award to plaintiff survives after reversal of judgment | Fees appropriate under Song‑Beverly if judgment stands | If the judgment is reversed, the fee award must also be reversed | Fee award reversed along with the judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (express warranty does not cover latent defects that first malfunction after the warranty term)
- Kiluk v. Mercedes‑Benz USA, LLC, 43 Cal.App.5th 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (Song‑Beverly generally imposes used‑car implied‑warranty obligations on distributors/retailers, not manufacturers unless they act as sellers)
- Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 985 (Cal. 1998) (Song‑Beverly is remedial and construed to benefit consumers, but courts must give effect to statutory text)
- Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal.3d 112 (Cal. 1982) (standard for appellate review of nonsuit)