Ruggles v. Yagong.
353 P.3d 953
Haw.2015Background
- Hawai'i County voters enacted the Lowest Law Enforcement Priority of Cannabis (LLEP) in 2008 to deprioritize cannabis offenses involving adult personal use on private property and reallocate resources toward serious crimes and public needs.
- LLEP includes directive provisions (14-99, 14-100, 14-101, 14-102, 14-103) and corrective mechanisms (advisory 14-104 and severability 14-105) intended to resolve conflicts with state law.
- Plaintiffs, pro se Hawai'i County residents, allege the County Council, prosecutors, and police violated LLEP by continuing cannabis prosecutions and by improper funding, reporting, and oversight.
- Circuit Court granted judgments on the pleadings, holding that LLEP is preempted by state law and unenforceable in its entirety, and the Final Judgment was affirmed by the ICA in Ruggles v. Yagong, 132 Hawai'i 511, 323 P.3d 155 (App. 2014).
- The majority affirmatively held that LLEP conflicts with state law (HRS Chapter 329 and certain penal provisions) and is preempted, thereby invalidating the entire ordinance.
- Dissenting views argue that advisory and severability provisions preserve the will of the people and allow the remaining non-conflicting aspects to stand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption under Richardson prong two | Ruggles argues no conflict with state law; if conflict exists it should not preempt entirely. | ICA held LLEP conflicts with state penal and enforcement laws, thus preempted. | LLEP preempted under Richardson prong two. |
| Field preemption under Richardson prong one | LLEP does not occupy a field expressly or impliedly exclusive to state law. | State law comprehensively covers controlled substances; LLEP overlaps the subject matter. | First prong not necessary to decide; overruled ICA only to extent applicable to first prong. |
| Advisory versus mandatory provisions and severability | Advisory provisions preserve the will of the people; severability allows remaining provisions to stand. | LLEP’s provisions are fully preempted; severability does not rescue the ordinance. | Advisory and severability provisions prevent complete preemption; remaining non-conflicting parts may remain. |
| Effect of Section 14-104 (statutory interpretation) on preemption | Section 14-104 supports treating conflicting provisions as advisory rather than invalidating the ordinance. | Majority treated advisory provisions as nonbinding; conflicted provisions should be severed. | Section 14-104 is advisory in effect when conflict arises; severability further supports preserving the ordinance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46 (1994) (two-prong preemption test for local ordinances)
- Hurip v. Pacific International Services Corp., 76 Hawai'i 209 (1994) (preemption analysis under Richardson; field occupancy concept)
- Pacific International Serv. Corp. v. Hurip, 873 P.2d 88 (Haw. 1994) (interpretation of Richardson preemption principles)
- Amemiya v. Sapienza, 63 Haw. 424 (1981) (delegation of prosecutorial duties and authority)
- Rossi v. Brown, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 (1995) (liberal construction of initiative power; severability considerations)
- Associated Home Builders, etc. v. City of Daly City, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 41 (Cal. 2002) (liberal interpretation of initiative power; advisory versus binding effect)
- O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 67 (2007) (field preemption and comprehensive acts in uniform control statutes)
- Wilson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 122 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (deference to initiative power; preservation of will)
- Lingle v. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n, 124 Hawai'i 197 (2010) (statutory interpretation and plain meaning rule)