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Rufer v. Federal Election Commission
64 F. Supp. 3d 195
D.D.C.
2014
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Background

  • Plaintiffs (Republican and Libertarian party committees and a Libertarian donor) seek to accept unlimited contributions into segregated funds to finance independent, non-coordinated federal-election expenditures and challenge federal limits that prevent them from doing so.
  • They moved to convene a three-judge district court under BCRA § 403; Libertarian plaintiffs alternatively asked the district court to certify constitutional questions to the D.C. Circuit en banc under 2 U.S.C. § 437h and sought a preliminary injunction.
  • The challenged rules include FECA base contribution limits (2 U.S.C. § 441a) and BCRA’s prohibitions on parties’ receipt/use of funds raised outside those limits (2 U.S.C. § 441i).
  • Plaintiffs rely on independent-expenditure precedents (e.g., Citizens United, SpeechNow) holding that contributions to non-coordinating entities pose no anti-corruption interest sufficient to justify limits; the FEC relies on precedents upholding party contribution limits (e.g., Buckley, McConnell, McCutcheon).
  • The court found Plaintiffs’ constitutional questions substantial (not frivolous) but held that relief redressing Plaintiffs’ injury requires invalidating longstanding FECA base limits, which cannot be adjudicated by a three-judge BCRA court; therefore the issues must be certified to the D.C. Circuit en banc under § 437h.
  • The court denied the Libertarian plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction because their claim, while substantial, conflicts with controlling Supreme Court precedent upholding party contribution limits and the other preliminary-injunction factors (likelihood of success, public interest, irreparable harm) did not favor relief.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether a three-judge court must hear these challenges under BCRA § 403 Plaintiffs: BCRA’s three-judge procedure applies and should adjudicate their as-applied challenge to the contribution regime. FEC: Plaintiffs’ claims are foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent and, in any event, many claims target FECA base limits that a BCRA three-judge court lacks power to invalidate. Denied: three-judge court not appropriate for FECA base-limit challenges; claims must be certified to the en banc D.C. Circuit under § 437h.
Whether district court should certify constitutional questions to D.C. Circuit en banc under 2 U.S.C. § 437h Plaintiffs: § 437h governs FECA challenges and allows direct en banc appellate review; certification is proper because relief requires invalidating FECA base limits. FEC: some questions are foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, but does not dispute procedural availability of § 437h for FECA challenges. Granted: court will certify substantive constitutional questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit and develop a narrow adjudicative record for appellate review.
Standing to obtain relief in a three-judge BCRA court Plaintiffs: they suffer concrete injury from being unable to accept unlimited funds for independent expenditures and can seek relief under BCRA three-judge procedure. FEC: Plaintiffs cannot obtain redress from a BCRA three-judge court because invalidating FECA base limits (not BCRA amendments) is necessary; McConnell forecloses standing there. Held for FEC: plaintiffs lack standing to proceed in a BCRA three-judge court because redress requires invalidating preexisting FECA limits.
Whether to grant preliminary injunction forbidding enforcement of party base limits as applied to independent expenditures Libertarian Pls.: likely to succeed and will suffer irreparable harm unless injunction issues. FEC: plaintiffs’ claim conflicts with controlling Supreme Court precedent; preliminary relief is extraordinary and would disrupt election law regime. Denied: plaintiffs’ likelihood of success is doubtful given Supreme Court precedent; balance of equities, public interest, and irreparable harm factors do not favor injunction.

Key Cases Cited

  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding contribution limits to candidates under anti-corruption rationale)
  • McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding BCRA’s soft-money restrictions and explaining limits on three-judge BCRA court jurisdiction over preexisting FECA provisions)
  • Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption justification for contribution limits)
  • McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (struck aggregate limits but left FECA base limits intact)
  • SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (under Citizens United, no anti-corruption interest supports limiting contributions to independent-expenditure entities)
  • Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (hybrid organizations may make unlimited independent expenditures if funds are segregated)
  • RNC v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010) (three-judge court rejected as-applied challenge to BCRA’s soft-money ban citing McConnell)
  • Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (district court must develop an adjudicative record before § 437h certification)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Rufer v. Federal Election Commission
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Aug 19, 2014
Citation: 64 F. Supp. 3d 195
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-0837
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.