Ruez v. Lake Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr.
2017 Ohio 4125
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Patricia Ruez was an LCESC intervention specialist serving two school districts on a part‑time/itinerant contract (2.5 days/week in each district) during 2014–2015.
- Kirtland and Fairport Harbor reduced the hours/funding for preschool intervention for 2015–2016; LCESC’s board voted to reduce Ruez’s days from 183 to 72 and notified her in June 2015.
- LCESC attempted to find additional hours for Ruez; she inquired about a full‑time vacancy but did not pursue it and retired in early August 2015 after LCESC secured replacements.
- Ruez sued for breach of contract and age discrimination; LCESC moved for summary judgment supported by affidavits from LCESC officials.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for LCESC, holding no contract breach (statutory authorization and contract clause tied to funding) and that Ruez failed to make a prima facie age‑discrimination showing or to show pretext.
- Appeal contested application of R.C. 3319.17, prima facie constructive discharge, and pretext; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did LCESC breach Ruez’s contract by reducing her hours? | Ruez argued LCESC improperly suspended/reduced her contract and relied on the wrong subsection of R.C. 3319.17. | LCESC argued reductions were authorized by R.C. 3319.17(B)(1) due to reduced district funding and contract language permitting suspension if funds are reduced. | No breach: reduction authorized under R.C. 3319.17(B)(1) and contract clause allowing suspension for funding loss. |
| Could R.C. 3319.17(B)(3) (interdistrict contract termination) control instead? | Ruez contended (implied) B(3) applies and neither district terminated contracts, so reduction was improper. | LCESC: B(3) is inapplicable; B(1) covers financial reductions; argument waived since not raised below. | B(1) governs; B(3) inapplicable; B(3) argument waived. |
| Did Ruez establish constructive discharge to make a prima facie age‑discrimination claim? | Ruez argued the drastic reduction in hours constituted constructive discharge permitting an age‑discrimination prima facie showing. | LCESC argued she remained employed (albeit reduced hours), LCESC sought additional hours, and she retired voluntarily. | No constructive discharge: continued employment and prospect of more hours; cases cited by Ruez distinguishable. |
| If prima facie established, did Ruez show LCESC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual? | Ruez relied on an unpublished/unalleged deposition excerpt to show pretext. | LCESC relied on district funding reductions as legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. | No genuine dispute of material fact on pretext; deposition not in record and cannot be considered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Loopco Indus., 66 Ohio St.3d 64 (1993) (summary judgment should be entered with circumspection)
- Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116 (1980) (trial court may not weigh evidence on summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard on whether reasonable jury could find for nonmoving party)
- Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 501 (1991) (elements of prima facie age discrimination in indirect‑evidence cases)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for burden shifting in discrimination cases)
- Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578 (1996) (definition of constructive discharge)
- Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 F.3d 1121 (6th Cir. 1998) (constructive discharge where employee had no reasonable prospect of continued employment and chose retirement)