Rudy Liddell v.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14698
6th Cir.2013Background
- Rudy Liddell, a federal prisoner convicted in 2001 of drug conspiracy, distribution of marijuana, and being a felon in possession of a firearm; original sentence 324 months, later reduced to 204 months.
- Liddell filed a § 2255 motion in 2004 which the district court denied on the merits.
- He seeks this court’s authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer and prosecutorial suppression of a plea offer; he also reiterates prior claims that counsel slept at trial and that he tried to terminate counsel during trial.
- Liddell contends he did not raise these issues earlier because he was unfamiliar with the law and because Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper allegedly created new, retroactive rules governing plea-offer ineffective-assistance claims.
- Statutory standard: to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255, a movant must make a prima facie showing of either newly discovered evidence that would likely overturn guilt or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Liddell may file a successive § 2255 based on counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer / prosecutorial suppression of a plea offer | Liddell: counsel never presented a plea offer; prosecutor suppressed plea option; Frye/Lafler create new, retroactive rule permitting relief | Government: claim is successive; Liddell fails to satisfy § 2255(h) standards; Frye/Lafler did not create a new retroactive rule; prior claims are barred | Denied — Liddell failed to make the prima facie showing required for authorization; Frye/Lafler do not supply a retroactive rule for collateral review |
| Whether the sleeping-at-trial ineffective-assistance claim can be relitigated as successive | Liddell reasserts trial-counsel-slept claim | Government: claim was raised before and is barred as successive | Denied as barred — claim previously presented and therefore not cognizable in a successive petition |
| Whether Frye and Lafler are new, retroactive rules under § 2255(h)(2) | Liddell: Frye/Lafler created new rules that were previously unavailable | Government: other circuits have held Frye/Lafler are not new, retroactive rules | Court: follows other circuits — Frye/Lafler are not new retroactive rules for collateral review |
| Whether the district court’s prior characterization of the 2004 filing prevents successive-treatment now | Liddell: district court failed to warn or properly characterize prior motion, so current motion should not be treated as successive | Government: record shows Liddell himself characterized the 2004 motion as a § 2255 motion | Denied — record contradicts Liddell’s claim; successive treatment is proper |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Green, 144 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.) (standard for authorization to file successive § 2255)
- Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753 (6th Cir.) (claims presented in a prior § 2255 are barred in successive petitions)
- In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir.) (Frye/Lafler do not announce a new rule made retroactive for collateral review)
- Gallagher v. United States, 711 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (same)
- Williams v. United States, 705 F.3d 293 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (same)