Rudd Equipment Co. v. John Deere Construction & Forestry Co.
834 F.3d 589
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Rudd Equipment, a long-time Hitachi dealer, sued Deere seeking injunctive relief to preserve dealer agreements pending arbitration after Deere sought to terminate those agreements.
- Rudd filed a motion to seal the entire case (including the existence of the suit), claiming public disclosure would cause devastating business harm; the district court entered a sealing order early in the case without written findings.
- Parties proceeded with sealed filings; an Agreed Order resolving interim relief was entered under seal after a mediation; the arbitration panel later requested a copy of that Agreed Order.
- Deere disclosed the Agreed Order to the arbitration panel and then moved to vacate the court’s sealing order, arguing the court had not made the required findings to justify sealing and that the public presumptive right of access prevailed.
- The magistrate judge recommended unsealing; the district court adopted that recommendation and vacated the seal. Rudd appealed the unsealing order; this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rudd) | Defendant's Argument (Deere) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court improperly unsealed the case | Rudd argued the seal was necessary to prevent substantial business harm (loss of customers, employees, goodwill) and that it had relied on the seal | Deere argued the sealing order lacked required on-the-record findings and that public access presumption outweighs Rudd’s claimed harms; Deere could not waive public access | Court held the seal was vacated properly: district court failed to make required findings and the public’s strong presumption of access outweighed Rudd’s asserted harms |
| Whether a party can rely on another party’s acquiescence to a seal to block unsealing | Rudd contended Deere waived challenge by not objecting and by filing under seal | Deere maintained the public’s access rights cannot be waived by private parties; court must independently protect public interest | Court held Deere could not waive the public’s right; the court must independently assess sealing and may unseal despite parties’ prior conduct |
| Role of party reliance on an existing sealing order in the balancing test | Rudd urged that reliance should shift the standard and make seals effectively irreversible absent extraordinary circumstances | Deere and the court argued reliance is one factor to consider but does not displace the Brown & Williamson balancing test | Court held reliance is relevant but does not replace the usual balancing; Rudd’s reliance was insufficient to overcome presumption of access |
| Appellate jurisdiction over unsealing order | Rudd claimed collateral-order jurisdiction to appeal immediately | Deere did not dispute and argued merits were separate from unsealing | Court held it had jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review the unsealing order |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.) (discusses presumption of access and consideration of party reliance on protective orders)
- Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983) (establishes strong presumption in favor of public access to court records)
- Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (outlines factors for public access to judicial records)
- Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (sets out collateral-order doctrine for interlocutory appeals)
- In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discusses finality and reviewability of unsealing orders)
- In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (explains irreversibility of disclosure and reviewability of unsealing)
- Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1979) (recognizes irretrievability of confidentiality once documents are disclosed)
- Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002) (requires document-by-document analysis when sealing court records)
- Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1991) (district courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders)