Rucker v. Kijakazi
48 F.4th 86
2d Cir.2022Background
- Jessica Rucker (b.1991) applied for SSI alleging onset in 2016; ALJ Koennecke denied benefits and the Appeals Council declined review; the district court affirmed, and Rucker appealed.
- Rucker has IQ ~70 and longstanding psychiatric diagnoses (bipolar disorder/unspecified bipolar, borderline personality disorder, schizoaffective disorder, depression) with multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, suicidality, auditory hallucinations, and long-term treatment by psychiatrist Dr. Sobia Mirza and LCSW Megan Hagerbaumer.
- Treating providers (Mirza, Hagerbaumer) completed function reports indicating marked/extreme limitations, including an opinion that Rucker could not maintain regular attendance at work due to psychologically based symptoms.
- Consultative and non‑treating examiners (Dr. Long, Dr. Juriga, Dr. Krantweiss) gave more moderate assessments; Dr. Krantweiss documented IQ 70 and academic/adaptive deficits.
- ALJ found Rucker could perform simple, unskilled work with no public contact, "normal supervision," and no exertional physical limitations; she concluded Rucker was not disabled physically or mentally.
- Second Circuit: affirmed ALJ as to physical impairments (substantial evidence) but held the ALJ erred in assessing RFC regarding social interaction and in applying the treating‑physician rule to Dr. Mirza; court affirmed in part and remanded in part for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of RFC for social interactions | Rucker: ALJ failed to account for marked/moderate social limits (coworkers/supervisors) and gave no time/interaction caps — RFC understates nonexertional limits | Commissioner: Vocational expert identified jobs with minimal human interaction; omission is harmless because identified jobs have the lowest interaction requirements | Court: ALJ’s social‑interaction analysis not supported by substantial evidence; omission not harmless; remand required |
| Treating‑physician rule re: Dr. Mirza’s checklist | Rucker: ALJ improperly discounted treating psychiatrist’s marked limitation (esp. attendance) without "good reasons" | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly gave limited weight due to reliance on claimant’s subjective reports, inconsistent progress notes, and some normal mental status findings | Court: ALJ misapplied treating‑physician rule; the five reasons given were inadequate; remand for proper application |
| Capacity to maintain regular attendance/work consistency | Rucker: treating opinion indicates marked limitation in maintaining attendance; cannot sustain work | Commissioner: Treatment attendance and contemporaneous notes show ability to attend appointments and some organized/concentrated functioning; VE testimony supports availability of work | Court: ALJ’s finding that psychiatric limitations do not diminish ability to work consistently is not supported by substantial evidence; tied to treating‑physician error; remand |
| Physical impairments (back pain, obesity, hypertension) | Rucker: treating/exam opinions indicate moderate physical restrictions (walking, standing, sitting, lifting) | Commissioner: Objective record shows conservative treatment, benign exams, and lack of supportive objective evidence; ALJ reasonably rejected more restrictive opinion | Court: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s determination that physical impairments are not disabling; that part of the judgment is affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.) (ALJ must apply correct legal standards and review is for substantial evidence)
- Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64 (2d Cir.) (ALJ must apply substance of treating physician rule; opinion need not match a single medical source)
- Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353 (2d Cir.) (substantial‑evidence standard is not high; psychiatric functioning is longitudinal and individualized)
- Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir.) (ALJs should not rely heavily on one‑time consultative exams over treating sources)
- Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172 (2d Cir.) (review focuses on correct legal standards and substantial evidence)
- Green‑Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.) (clinician reliance on patient’s subjective reports does not alone undermine medical opinion)
- Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578 (2d Cir.) (ALJ may reject a medical opinion inconsistent with the record)
- Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.) (ALJ may set aside opinions contradicted by the weight of other evidence)