Ruby Hicks v. Doris Scott
958 F.3d 421
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Shortly before 11:00 PM officers responded to a menacing report and, without a warrant or exigency, entered an unlocked side door of a two‑family house at 1751 Chase Ave.
- The side door opened into a foyer and stairwell leading to a second‑/third‑floor unit rented by Quandavier Hicks; officers went up the stairs and knocked on interior doors.
- When a door opened, officers observed a rifle barrel pointed toward Officer Scott at roughly "a few feet"; Moore grabbed the barrel and Scott fired, killing Quandavier.
- Officers radioed for paramedics; Schneider attempted to render aid but was diverted to secure the third floor; Loreaux offered to help but was told Quandavier was dead; no medical aid reached Quandavier and he died at the scene.
- Hicks (administrator) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (unlawful entry, excessive force, deliberate indifference) and asserted state claims (wrongful death, battery); district court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity and Ohio statutory immunity grounds.
- Sixth Circuit: reversed qualified immunity as to unlawful entry, affirmed as to excessive force and deliberate‑indifference claims, vacated summary judgment on municipal liability and remanded wrongful‑death aspects tied to the entry ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unlawful warrantless entry (Fourth Amendment) | Hicks: foyer/stairwell/landing were interior/curtilage of Quandavier’s unit; officers lacked consent/warrant/exigency. | Officers: unlocked door and multi‑unit layout made space non‑private; reasonable mistake. | Reversed summary judgment; factual record supports expectation of privacy and right was clearly established, so no qualified immunity for Scott, Moore, Schneider. |
| Excessive force (deadly force by Officer Scott) | Hicks: shooting was unreasonable and warning/retreat were required. | Scott: rifle was pointed at her from ~5 feet; split‑second threat justified deadly force. | Affirmed summary judgment for Scott; use of deadly force was objectively reasonable and qualified immunity applies. |
| Deliberate indifference to medical needs (Fourteenth Amendment) | Hicks: officers failed to provide or permit timely medical aid after the shooting. | Defendants: they promptly summoned EMS; reliance on calls and scene‑safety concerns absolve liability. | Affirmed for Scott and Moore (promptly summoned aid); Schneider also entitled to qualified immunity—no evidence he knew and consciously disregarded an ongoing serious need. |
| Municipal liability & Ohio wrongful‑death/battery (state law immunity) | Hicks: City liable under Monell if officers violated constitutional rights; wrongful death/battery survive where immunity inapplicable. | City: no municipal liability without underlying constitutional violation; officers claim Ohio statutory immunity. | Vacated summary judgment for City and remanded municipal liability/wrongful‑death issues for district court review; officers have statutory immunity for battery and for wrongful‑death claims to the extent tied to use‑of‑force/medical decisions, but not for wrongful‑death claims premised on the unlawful entry. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑prong framework)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy test)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (property‑based Fourth Amendment protection of the home/curtilage)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (physical trespass theory of search)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless entry into home presumptively unconstitutional)
- Carriger v. United States, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976) (tenant privacy in multi‑unit common areas)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective‑reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2009) (deference to officer split‑second judgments)
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where reasonable belief the search was lawful)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference standard for medical care)
- Wilkerson v. City of Akron, 906 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 2018) (summoning aid generally satisfies Fourteenth Amendment absent intentional/reckless delay)
- United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (open or ajar door does not necessarily justify warrantless entry)