Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
138 S. Ct. 816
SCOTUS2018Background
- Petitioners obtained a default §1605A judgment against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism (1997 Hamas suicide bombings) and converted an earlier §1605(a)(7) judgment to §1605A.
- Petitioners sought to execute the judgment by attaching the Persepolis Collection (≈30,000 clay tablets) held by the University of Chicago; petitioners invoked 28 U.S.C. §1610(g).
- District Court and Seventh Circuit held §1610(g) does not itself strip property immunity; it identifies property categories and abrogates Bancec factors but requires another §1610 basis to remove immunity.
- Central statutory framework: FSIA grants jurisdictional and property immunities (§1604, §1609) with exceptions (§1605A for terrorism); §1610 lists when property is not immune.
- §1610(g) (added 2008) incorporates the Bancec factors (subparagraphs A–E) and states certain property is “subject to attachment…as provided in this section.”
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit: §1610(g) does not create a freestanding exception to property immunity; a separate §1610 provision must rescind immunity before attachment/execution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1610(g) is a freestanding statutory basis to attach/execute property for §1605A judgments | §1610(g) creates a blanket exception: any property of a state or its agencies is subject to attachment/execution upon a §1605A judgment | §1610(g) merely abrogates the Bancec separateness inquiry for agencies/instrumentalities; property immunity must still be rescinded by another §1610 provision | No. §1610(g) is not freestanding; plaintiffs must identify an independent §1610 immunity-abrogating provision |
| Whether the phrase “as provided in this section” refers to §1610 as a whole or to specific (f) procedures (including a waived §1610(f)(1)) | “This section” points to §1610(f) procedures or to the NDAA context, so §1610(g) supplies the enforcement mechanism even if (f)(1) was waived | The most natural reading is that it incorporates §1610 as a whole; (f)(1) has distinct language and (f)(2) does not authorize attachment/execution | Court reads it to refer to §1610 as a whole; not a substitute for (f)(1) and not a drafting error |
| Whether the phrase “property of a foreign state” renders part of §1610(g) superfluous if §1610(g) only abrogates Bancec | Those words must mean §1610(g) independently withdraws immunity for state property (since Bancec wouldn’t apply to state property) | The clause aggregates categories of property (state and agencies) and limits §1610(g) to §1605A judgments; it prevents §1610(g) from applying outside the terrorism-judgment context | Words are not superfluous; they identify both the property categories and the contextual trigger (a §1605A judgment) |
Key Cases Cited
- First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (Bancec) (agencies/instrumentalities treated as separate juridical entities but exceptions exist)
- Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (FSIA implements the restrictive theory; commercial-activity focus for waiving immunity)
- Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (interpretive point that “except as provided in this section” can incorporate the remainder of a section)
- Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (statutory-construction canon that statutes should be read to give effect to all provisions)
- Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375 (articulating the five Bancec factors used by courts)