Ruben v. Las Vegas NV city govt
2:17-cv-01003
D. Nev.May 10, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Terence E. Ruben, proceeding pro se, sued the City of Las Vegas and Texas City under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 for alleged police assaults, wrongful arrests, and theft/collusion with his roommates occurring between May 2013 and January 2014.
- Ruben alleged multiple incidents: a May 2013 arrest after an altercation with his mother, an alleged November 2013 assault and loss of property at a gas station involving Texas City officers, and January 2014 incidents involving Las Vegas Metropolitan Police and roommates allegedly stealing his belongings.
- Ruben filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and provided a financial affidavit showing disability income and inability to prepay fees; the court granted IFP status.
- The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Rule 8, applying the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard and pro se leniency from Erickson.
- The court concluded Ruben’s federal claims accrued no later than November 2013 (Texas City) and January 2014 (Las Vegas) and that Ruben filed suit on April 6, 2017, so the § 1981/§ 1983/§ 1985 claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year limitations period.
- The court dismissed the claims with leave to amend, giving Ruben an opportunity to plead facts supporting equitable tolling of the limitations period; amended complaint due June 16, 2017, or recommendation of dismissal with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ruben may proceed IFP | Ruben is disabled, unemployed, and cannot pay filing fees | N/A | Granted (28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)) |
| Whether the complaint states timely federal claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 | Ruben alleges constitutional violations and conspiracies by police and roommates occurring 2013–2014 | Claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations; suit filed in 2017 | Claims are time-barred and dismissed under § 1915(e)(2) unless tolling shown |
| Whether equitable tolling applies | Ruben may contend facts warranting equitable tolling (diligence, deception, etc.) | Defendants note delay and prejudice; burden on Ruben to show tolling factors | Court permitted amendment to plead equitable tolling; did not find tolling on the face of the complaint |
| Pleading sufficiency under Rule 8/Twombly–Iqbal (pro se) | Pro se status merits leniency; claims should be construed to include §§ 1981 and 1985 | Complaint is vague, disorganized, and contains numerous pleading defects | Court applied pleading standards, dismissed for timeliness but allowed leave to amend to cure defects/tolling allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se complaints held to less stringent standards)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (two-step plausibility analysis)
- Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 claims borrow state personal-injury limitations)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (limitations period for § 1981 claims depends on whether claim rests on post-1990 amendment)
- Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995) (leave to amend required unless amendment cannot cure defects)