2017 Ohio 9221
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- In 1966 John and James Johnson (with James’ wife Sheila listed) conveyed 2/3 interest in three tracts to Gary Rubel; the deed included a prior-recorded oil-royalty clause and the disputed clause: “Subject, however, to all right, title and interest of the grantor herein in the above three tracts in all minerals rights thereunder including coal, gas and oil.”
- On the same day an executor’s deed (conveying the remaining 1/3 to Rubel) contained similar language, but Appellee’s claim rests on the 1966 warranty deed from John and James to Rubel.
- Rubels later (2006) conveyed to themselves jointly; in 2013 they sought a declaratory judgment that the “subject to” clause did not reserve minerals and that any minerals had been abandoned (the abandonment count was later withdrawn).
- Parties stipulated facts and submitted briefs; trial court found the 1966 “subject to” clause clearly and unambiguously reserved a 1/3 mineral interest for the grantor (i.e., James), awarding that 1/3 to Sheila Johnson.
- On appeal, Rubels argued the clause merely limited the warranty (referencing existing matters) and did not create a new reservation; Johnson argued the clause reserved the grantor’s mineral rights and that no particular “magic words” were required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rubel) | Defendant's Argument (Johnson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1966 deed’s “Subject, however, to…” clause reserved the grantor’s mineral interest | The phrase “subject to” merely conditions the transfer on existing matters and limits the warranty; it does not create affirmative reservation without words like “reserve” or “except” | The clause, read in context, expressly reserves all of the grantor’s right, title, and interest in all mineral rights under the three tracts; no magic words required | The clause, in context, unambiguously created an exception/reservation of the grantor’s 1/3 mineral interest and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311 (1996) (deed/contract interpretation seeks parties’ intent from instrument language)
- Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295 (1906) (reservation or exception depends on construction of the whole instrument)
- Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316 (1965) ("subject to" clause interpreted as reservation of mineral rights rather than mere warranty limitation)
- Kelley v. Haas, 262 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) ("subject to" language held effective to except/reserve mineral rights)
- Walker v. Foss, 930 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (context matters; "subject to" can protect warranty but may create reservation depending on subsequent wording)