Royce Brown v. John F. Caraway
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9486
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Brown was convicted in 1996 in Delaware district court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon.
- He was classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior felony convictions, including Arson in the Third Degree.
- The career-offender designation produced a higher guideline range (360 months to life) than the non-career-offender range (262 to 327 months).
- Brown timely challenged his sentence via §2255 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the career-offender designation; the district court and Third Circuit rejected relief.
- Brown later filed a pro se §2241 petition in Indiana challenging the arson conviction under Begay v. United States, arguing the Delaware conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence. The district court dismissed the petition as an inadequate savings-clause claim, and the Seventh Circuit granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2241 relief is available for a misapplication of the career-offender guideline | Brown | Government | Yes; §2241 relief available under the savings clause |
| Whether Arson in the Third Degree is a crime of violence under §4B1.1 | Brown | Government | No; not within elements, enumerated, or residual clauses |
| Whether Begay is retroactive and renders §2255 inadequate to challenge the sentence | Brown | Government | Yes; Begay provides retroactive clarification allowing §2241 relief under Davenport framework |
| Whether Narvaez and Davenport foreclose or permit relief for post-Booker sentencing errors | Brown | Government | Relief permitted under Narvaez when post-conviction law clarifies illegality of the sentence; panel adopts this path over some sister circuits |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court 2008) (postconviction clarification; generic arson requires purposeful conduct; applicability to §§2241 relief)
- Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011) (misapplication of career-offender guideline; miscarriage of justice; supports §2241 relief for sentencing error)
- United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (residual clause requires purposeful conduct; recklessness not within Begay’s residual clause scope)
- United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992) (reckless-endangering as crime of violence under §4B1.2 before Begay tightened law (overruled by Begay))
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (Supreme Court 1990) (uniform, generic definition for enumerated offenses in checking state-law labels)