Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 914 F.3d 52

Background

Tara Roy, a CCS-employed nurse at Maine State Prison, alleged pervasive sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct by multiple MDOC corrections officers between 2012–2014, and repeatedly complained to CCS supervisors and MDOC.
Complaints included sexualized comments and physical contact by officers (Snow, Turner, Parrow), requests for confidential inmate medical information, and officers abandoning posts leaving Roy alone with inmates.
CCS sometimes forwarded complaints to MDOC but inconsistently; MDOC investigated some incidents (e.g., Parrow) but did not meaningfully investigate others and treated certain off-duty/social-media conduct as non-actionable.
After a disputed September 26, 2014 incident about alleged unattended inmates, MDOC’s deputy warden expressed frustration and sought to revoke Roy’s security clearance; MDOC revoked the clearance and CCS terminated Roy in October 2014.
Roy sued CCS (Title VII, MHRA, MWPA-related claims), MDOC (§ 4633 MHRA claims), and two prison supervisors under § 1983 (Equal Protection and First Amendment). The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants; the First Circuit reversed as to CCS and MDOC and affirmed as to the supervisors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Roy was subjected to a hostile work environment based on sex	Roy: repeated sexualized comments, epithets, sexual texts, and dangerous conduct (officers leaving post) were sex‑based, severe or pervasive	Defendants: many incidents unrelated to sex or not severe/pervasive enough	Court: A reasonable jury could find harassment was sex‑based and sufficiently severe or pervasive (denied summary judgment)
Whether MHRA § 4633 permits suits against non‑employer third parties (MDOC) for workplace interference/retaliation	Roy: § 4633’s text, history, and MHRC practice allow claims against any “person” that interferes with MHRA rights	MDOC: Fuhrmann bars non‑employer liability; MHRA targets employers only	Court: § 4633 covers non‑employer third parties; Fuhrmann did not decide § 4633 scope; Roy’s § 4633 claims survive summary judgment
Whether CCS can be liable under Title VII/MHRA for hostile environment created by non‑employees and for retaliation/whistleblower retaliation	Roy: CCS knew of harassment, had means to influence MDOC and failed to take reasonable steps; termination may have been pretextual (transfer alternatives exist)	CCS: officers were non‑employees and CCS lacked authority to correct; termination followed MDOC clearance revocation	Court: Employer liability applies where employer knew/failed to take reasonable measures; factual disputes (knowledge, reasonableness, causation, pretext, transfer possibility) require jury trial; retaliation and MWPA‑related whistleblower claims go to jury
Whether prison supervisors (Bouffard, Ross) are liable under § 1983 (Equal Protection, First Amendment)	Roy: supervisors condoned or were deliberately indifferent to harassment and revoked clearance in retaliation for complaints	Defendants: qualified immunity; reasonable officials could view actions as lawful (investigations occurred; complaints were internal)	Court: Qualified immunity applies; reasonable officials could have believed no constitutional violation occurred; summary judgment affirmed for supervisors

Key Cases Cited

Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (hostile work environment standard)
O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001) (elements of hostile environment claim)
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but‑for causation for retaliation claims)
Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., 58 A.3d 1083 (Me. 2012) (individual supervisor liability under MHRA analyzed; distinguished here)
Medina‑Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132 (1st Cir. 2013) (employer liability for third‑party harassment principles)
Beckford v. Dep't of Corr., 605 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2010) (prison context: employer duties regarding third‑party harassment)