Rowland v. Buehrer
2017 Ohio 7096
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Diane Rowland, a Dayton Public Schools bus driver, alleged her January 14, 2015 workplace fall substantially aggravated a preexisting left supraspinatus (rotator cuff) tear first treated after a 2011 fall; she filed a workers’ compensation-related civil claim seeking allowance for the tear.
- Rowland’s treating surgeon, Dr. Jonathon Paley, testified he treated a symptomatic preexisting tear (2011), examined her after the 2015 fall, ordered an MRI (March 24, 2015) showing a high-grade/essentially full-thickness supraspinatus tear, and performed surgical repair in September 2015.
- Paley testified the 2015 fall substantially aggravated the earlier tear based on history, objective shoulder exams (including drop-arm, Neer/Hawkins maneuvers, limited ROM, weakness), x-ray changes, the MRI, and the need for surgery.
- Dayton Public Schools moved in limine to exclude Paley’s testimony, arguing (1) Paley used an outdated/simple definition of “substantial aggravation” and (2) he failed to identify objective findings specifically proving a substantial aggravation as required by R.C. 4123.01(C)(4).
- The trial court initially granted the motion in limine and later, after reconsideration, reaffirmed exclusion and granted summary judgment for DPS because Rowland’s sole expert was excluded and therefore she could not meet her burden.
- The appellate court reversed: it held Paley’s testimony (history, objective clinical tests, MRI, and surgery) was sufficient to raise a triable issue whether the 2015 incident substantially aggravated the preexisting tear; exclusion was an abuse of discretion and the summary judgment was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Paley’s misstatement of the legal definition of “substantial aggravation” renders his testimony inadmissible | Paley need not quote statutory language; his medical opinion and testimony on causation and aggravation govern admissibility and any imprecision goes to weight, not admissibility | Paley used an outdated pre-Senate Bill 7 definition (mere worsening) and thus his opinion is unreliable under Evid. R. 702 and should be excluded | Court: Misstating legalese does not automatically render medical opinion inadmissible; the court abused discretion excluding Paley solely for that reason when his testimony otherwise met the statutory standard |
| Whether Paley provided objective evidence of a "substantial aggravation" as required by R.C. 4123.01(C)(4) | Paley identified objective clinical findings (drop-arm, limited ROM, weakness, positive provocative tests), x-ray changes, post-injury MRI showing high-grade/full-thickness tear, and surgery — collectively sufficient to show substantial aggravation | DPS: Post-injury objective findings showing a tear do not by themselves prove that the preexisting condition was "substantially aggravated"; Paley never identified objective evidence specifically demonstrating aggravation rather than mere existence of tear | Court: Paley’s combined testimony about preexisting symptoms, objective exams after the 2015 fall, the MRI, and surgical findings was sufficient to permit a jury to decide whether the aggravation was substantial; exclusion was an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403 (Ohio 2000) (abuse-of-discretion standard for trial-court evidentiary rulings)
- AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157 (Ohio 1990) (definition of abuse of discretion)
- Schell v. Glove Trucking, Inc., 48 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 1989) (pre-2006 law on aggravation; cited in historical discussion of change after statutory amendment)