485 P.3d 879
Okla. Civ. App.2020Background
- On Jan. 30, 2016, Marvin Rowell, a pretrial detainee who was intoxicated, was being escorted by two Muskogee County deputies to a restraint chair; one deputy allegedly pushed or allowed him to fall, causing fatal injuries.
- The estate sued the county and individual employees alleging violations of Article 2, §30 (unreasonable searches/seizures) of the Oklahoma Constitution (a "Bosh" excessive-force claim), 42 U.S.C. §1983, Article 2, §9, and an OGTCA negligence claim.
- Federal district court dismissed the §1983 and §9 claims and the OGTCA negligence claim (based on the OGTCA §155(25) jail-operation exception), granted summary judgment for the individual defendants on §1983, and remanded the remaining Article 2, §30 claim against the county to state court.
- In state court the county moved to dismiss, arguing the 2014 amendments to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA) brought constitutional torts within the OGTCA and that §155(25) immunized the county for acts arising from operation of a jail.
- The trial court granted dismissal; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding (1) constitutional torts (including Bosh claims) are governed by the OGTCA after the 2014 amendments, and (2) §155(25) bars the county's liability for actions taken in the operation of a jail, including moving a detainee within the facility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bosh (Art.2 §30) constitutional torts remain viable outside the OGTCA after the 2014 amendments | Rowell: Bosh established a constitutional tort outside the OGTCA; that cause of action survives despite legislative changes | County: 2014 amendments define "tort" to include constitutional claims, bringing them within the OGTCA's framework | Held: The 2014 OGTCA amendments apply to constitutional torts; Bosh claims are governed by the OGTCA |
| Whether OGTCA §155(25) (operation/equipping/maintenance of any jail) bars the county's liability for the alleged excessive force occurring while moving a detainee within the jail | Rowell: Applying §155(25) here is unfair; a similar push outside the jail would not be immunized | County: The statute plainly exempts liability for acts within the operation of a jail; moving detainees is part of prison operations | Held: §155(25) broadly immunizes the county for torts arising from the operation of a jail, so the §30 claim against the county is barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 305 P.3d 994 (Okla. 2013) (recognized Art.2 §30 excessive-force claim against municipalities outside OGTCA)
- Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 432 P.3d 233 (Okla. 2018) (applied OGTCA to bar inmates' constitutional tort claims after 2014 amendments)
- Washington v. Barry, 55 P.3d 1036 (Okla. 2002) (earlier recognition/analysis of constitutional torts outside OGTCA)
- Medina v. State, 871 P.2d 1379 (Okla. 1993) (broad purpose and intent of §155(25) to protect state from liability for penal institution operations)
- Redding v. State, 882 P.2d 61 (Okla. 1994) (§155(25) embraces myriad day-to-day prison operations)
- Horton v. State, 915 P.2d 352 (Okla. 1996) (§155(25) immunizes the state for the many activities involved in prison operations)