Rowan Ex Rel. Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 647 F. App'x 607

Background

After suffering a stroke, George Rowan Sr. moved into a Brookdale assisted‑living facility; he later wandered from the facility, was run over on a resident’s driveway, and suffered severe injuries. His son, Scott Rowan, sued Brookdale for negligence, gross negligence, and fraud on behalf of his father.
Brookdale moved to compel arbitration under a Residency Agreement Rowan Sr. signed when he moved in; the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Rowan opposed arbitration, arguing (1) Rowan Sr. lacked mental capacity to contract when he signed the Residency Agreement and (2) even if competent, multiple state‑law contract defenses render the arbitration clause unenforceable (public policy, lack of mutual assent, lack of consideration, invalid jury‑waiver, and financial burden).
The district court found no genuine issue of material fact on either formation (capacity) or enforceability and ordered arbitration; the Sixth Circuit reviews de novo, applying the FAA and treating disputes over formation like summary‑judgment questions.
The court examined evidence of Rowan Sr.’s cognitive state (family testimony, a cognitive therapist, a post‑move physician evaluation, multiple contemporaneous legal documents he signed, and a state agency’s assessment) and concluded no triable issue that he lacked reasonable perception of the agreement’s nature or terms.
On enforceability, the court applied Michigan contract law defenses and the FAA, rejecting each challenged ground and holding the arbitration clause clear and mutually supported by consideration.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Capacity to form contract	Rowan Sr. had short‑term memory problems, anxiety/delirium, prior wandering and needed extra supervision; thus lacked mental capacity when signing.	Evidence (family testimony, therapist, prior legal documents, state assessment) shows ability to understand and no evidence of incapacity sufficient to avoid the contract.	No genuine factual dispute; Rowan Sr. had sufficient perception of the Residency Agreement’s nature and terms.
Public‑policy invalidation	Arbitration clause waives jury rights under Michigan law and limits liability for gross negligence, undermining elder protections.	FAA preempts conflicting state rules; attacks on other contract provisions are for the arbitrator unless the challenge is specific to the arbitration clause.	Rejected: public‑policy and state statutory arguments fail; FAA favors arbitration.
Mutual assent / notice	Brookdale did not give Rowan Sr. an opportunity to read the agreement, so no mutual assent to the arbitration clause.	Michigan presumes a signer knows a written instrument; Brookdale provided the packet/Residency Agreement in advance and plaintiff offered no contrary evidence.	Rejected: presumption of knowledge and evidence of advance disclosure defeat the claim.
Consideration, jury‑waiver clarity, and cost burden	Arbitration clause lacks consideration, does not clearly waive jury trial, and imposes prohibitive costs.	Payment for services constitutes consideration; clause expressly and prominently waives jury trial; plaintiff fails to show specific intolerable costs.	Rejected: sufficient consideration, clear jury‑waiver language, and no showing of prohibitive costs.

Key Cases Cited

Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2002) (standard for showing a triable issue against arbitration mirrors summary judgment)
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) (procedures for courts when the making of an arbitration agreement is in issue)
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (test for knowing and voluntary waiver of rights in employment arbitration context)
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (FAA preempts contrary state policies limiting arbitration)
Klein v. Kent, 95 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1959) (plaintiff bears burden to prove lack of capacity to contract)
Howard v. Howard, 352 N.W.2d 280 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (standard for contractual capacity under Michigan law)